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ABSTRACT 
 
At the center of contemporary debates over public law lies administrative agencies’ discretion to impose 
rules. Yet, for every one of these rules, there are also unrules nearby. Often overlooked and sometimes barely 
visible, unrules are the decisions that regulators make to lift or limit the scope of a regulatory obligation, for 
instance through waivers, exemptions, and exceptions. In some cases, unrules enable regulators to reduce 
burdens on regulated entities or to conserve valuable government resources in ways that make law more 
efficient. However, too much discretion to create unrules can facilitate undue business influence over the law, 
weaken regulatory schemes, and even undermine the rule of law. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic 
empirical investigation of the hidden world of unrules. Using a computational linguistic approach to identify 
unrules across the Federal Register, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the United States Code, we show 
that unrules are an integral and substantial feature of the federal regulatory system. Our analysis shows that, 
by several conservative measures, there exists one obligation-alleviating word for approximately every five to 
six obligation-imposing words in federal law. We also show that unrules are surprisingly unrestrained by 
administrative law. In stark contrast to administrative law’s treatment of obligation-imposing rules, regulators 
wield substantially more discretion in deploying unrules to alleviate regulatory obligations. As a result, a major 
form of agency power remains hidden from view and relatively unencumbered by law. Recognizing the central 
role that unrules play in our regulatory system reveals the need to reorient administrative law and incorporate 
unrules more explicitly into its assumptions, doctrines, and procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Rules, as we all know, impose obligations. Federal law, for example, imposes obligations on 
manufacturers of new drugs and medical devices to complete a rigorous safety and efficacy review 
process overseen by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).1  Yet in 2019, nearly three 
quarters of all new drugs approved by the FDA and introduced into the market never completed the 
full review process. 2  Likewise, the vast majority of new medical devices that have entered the 
marketplace in recent years have bypassed the FDA premarket approval process altogether.3 In a 
similar manner, although federal regulations obligate commercial aircraft manufacturers to test every 
key component of any new line of airplanes, when the Boeing Corporation developed its now 
infamous 737 Max airplanes, it only followed an abbreviated certification process that allowed the 
company to sell its planes to customers years earlier than normal.4  
How could regulatory obligations on matters as vital as public health and safety be bypassed? 
Sociologists of law have long noted that rules on the books do not mirror the rules in action.5 Yet a key 
mechanism explaining such slippage has so far escaped systematic empirical study, a mechanism we call 
an unrule. Government possesses a ubiquitous yet often hidden power to limit or alleviate otherwise 
applicable regulatory obligations. Sometimes this power to alleviate obligations leads regulatory 
agencies to grant individual waivers, exemptions, or variances—a type of unrule that we call 
dispensations.6 At other times, unrules comprise what we call carveouts—exceptions and other limitations 
embedded within rules themselves, such as when a new regulation “grandfathers” existing businesses 
and exempts them from the coverage of its obligations. 7  Both types of unrules—carveouts and 
dispensations—can be found within every source and domain of law, including regulations governing 
health care,8 securities,9 environmental protection,10 transportation,11 and campaign finance.12 
 
1 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (imposing duty on manufacturers of new drugs to provide “adequate and well-controlled” clinical 
studies); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (imposing rules for determinations of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices). See also U.S. Food 
& Drug Administration, FDA’s Drug Review Process: Continued (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-
consumers/fdas-drug-review-process-continued; U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Overview of Device Regulation (Aug. 31, 
2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/overview-device-regulation.  
2  Peter Loftus, Fast-Track Drug Approval, Designed for Emergencies, Is Now Routine, WALL ST. J. (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-track-drug-approval-designed-for-emergencies-is-now-routine-11562337924 (stating 
that the FDA “approved a record 43 new drugs last year through fast-track programs that skip or shorten major steps other 
drugs must pass, or 73% of total new drugs”).  
3 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 
YEARS 4 (2011) (stating that only 1% of medical devices enter the market through the premarket approval process). See 
also JEANNE LENZER, THE DANGER WITHIN US: AMERICA’S UNTESTED, UNREGULATED MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY AND 
ONE MAN’S BATTLE TO SURVIVE IT (2018).  
4  See Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing 737 Max Certification, https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/ 
air_cert/airworthiness_certification/ (noting that the 737 Max was approved under an “amended type certificate” which can 
“typically take 3-5 years to complete” compared with “the certification of a new aircraft type [which] can take between 5 and 9 
years”). 
5 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); ELIZABETH MERTZ, LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, AND STEWART MACAULAY, LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER (2007). 
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See id. 
8 See infra notes 59-60, 91, 134-138 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 77, 82, 147 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 19-23, 47-48, 55-56, 92 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 78, 82, 188 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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Unrules can be highly consequential. With medical devices linked to an estimated 1.7 million 
injuries and 80,000 deaths over the past decade,13 it matters that 70 percent of all high-risk recalls of 
medical devices in recent years involved products approved through the FDA’s special fast-track 
approval process called the 510(k) program.14 Ostensibly designed as an exception for devices deemed 
“substantially equivalent” to an already approved device,15 this 510(k) program helps to explain why 
today most medical devices do not go through a government review process intended to demonstrate 
safety and effectiveness.16 These devices escape review even though every year hundreds of them, 
including surgical mesh and joint replacements, are implanted into patients’ bodies and can lead to 
devastating health consequences if they malfunction.17 Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler 
has characterized the 510(k) unrule as the “proverbial exception that has swallowed the rule.”18 
Or consider another example: a loophole established by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) allowing international tankers and other ships to escape from complying with 
otherwise applicable water pollution requirements when they enter the Great Lakes and other major 
inland bodies of water.19 According to one EPA official, the agency adopted a regulatory exemption 
for ships in 1973 simply because “[a]t the time we thought that was not an important area to deal 
with.” 20  But as a result of the agency’s unrule, ships coming from the Saint Lawrence Seaway 
discharged ballast water into the Great Lakes for decades, creating a runaway invasion of zebra 
mussels and other non-native species. 21  The invasive mussels clog municipal drainage pipes 
throughout the Great Lakes and cause millions of dollars in annual property damage.22  Similar 
problems from contaminated water discharges from ships has plagued other rivers and lakes 
throughout the United States, damaging fisheries and creating up to an estimated $7 billion in annual 
economic costs—not to mention an unquantified risk to human health from the pathogens and other 
pollutants contained in such discharges.23   
 
13 Hilary Fung & Antonio Cucho Gamboa, Everything You Need to Know About the Implant Files, INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.icij.org/investigations/implant-files/what-you-need-to-know-about-
the-implant-files/. 
14 21 C.F.R. § 807.100; see also ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS: HOW HEALTHCARE BECAME BIG BUSINESS 
AND HOW YOU CAN TAKE IT BACK 135 (2017). 
15  21 C.F.R. § 807.100; see also ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 132-135; JEANNE LENZER, THE DANGER WITHIN US: 
AMERICA'S UNTESTED, UNREGULATED MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY AND ONE MAN'S BATTLE TO SURVIVE IT (2018). 
16 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH: THE FDA 510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS AT 35 
YEARS, supra note 3, at 4-6.  
17 See Diana Zuckerman, Paul Brown, & Aditi Das, Lack of Publicly Available Scientific Evidence on the Safety and Effectiveness 
of Implanted Medical Devices, 174 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N INT. MED. 1781 (2014); see also Jeanne Lenzer & Shannon Brownlee, 
The FDA is Still Letting Doctors Implant Untested Devices into Our Bodies, WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-fda-is-still-letting-doctors-implant-untested-devices-into-our-bodies/ 
2019/01/04/d85207ae-0edf-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html. 
18 THE BLEEDING EDGE, at 18:30 (NETFLIX 2018).  
19 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,530 (May 22, 1973). 
20 Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1011 (2008). 
21 J. Brammeier & T. Cmar, Pathways toward a Policy of Preventing New Great Lakes Invasions, in REUBEN, IN P. KELLER, 
MARC CADOTTE & Glenn Sandiford, EDS., INVASIVE SPECIES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: ECOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY 358-361 (2014). 
22  U.S. Department of Agriculture, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/subject/ballast-water; Invasive Species: 
Progress and Challenges in Preventing Introduction into U.S. Waters Via the Ballast Water in Ships, U.S. Gov. Account. 
Office, GAO-05-1026T (Sept. 9, 2005), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-1026T. 
23 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Economic and Benefits Analysis of the 2013 Vessel General Permit (VGP) at 
130, 134 (Nov. 30, 2011), https://beta.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OW-2011-0150-0226. 
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Yet today, debate over government regulation too often overlooks the consequences of 
government’s power to alleviate obligations and instead almost exclusively focuses on a single 
dimension of regulatory power: the power to impose obligations. 24  Prominent members of the 
academy, government, and the courts routinely rail against crippling “over-regulation” and clamor 
that a tangle of “red tape” is suffocating private enterprise and hindering economic growth.25 Critics 
routinely cite the sheer volume of agency regulations as evidence that regulatory burdens have run 
amok.26 These concerns have contributed to both a political dialogue and a set of administrative law 
principles that today disproportionately aim to protect individuals and businesses from the 
imposition of regulatory obligations.27  
We seek with this Article to correct the prevailing myopic understanding of regulatory power 
and discretion in the United States. A focus on obligation imposition is only one side of the coin. 
Governmental authorities also exert significant power to alleviate obligations—power that can also 
be misused and create dramatic consequences for public welfare. A failure to appreciate the 
significance of unrules thus contributes both to an inflated sense of the onerousness of the U.S. 
regulatory system and to a cramped view of the kind of government discretion that administrative 
law has long sought to govern.  
In this Article, we offer a unified framework for understanding governmental power to 
alleviate obligations. We also offer, for the first time, systematic evidence of this less visible aspect of 
power and show how this evidence calls into question prevailing accounts that have relied exclusively 
on the quantification of regulatory obligations.28 Our analysis implies that government regulation is 
far less onerous—and far more flexible—than previously imagined. By showing the ubiquity of 
government’s power to alleviate obligations, we reveal how previous critiques of regulatory burdens 
overstate the true size, scope, and intrusiveness of regulation. We demonstrate through empirical 
analysis that an “unrulemaking” authority is omnipresent in the federal regulatory corpus.29 Our 
empirical analysis leads to a simple but powerful truth: a regulatory system can only be understood as 
the net effects of both its rules and its unrules. 
 That understanding also makes apparent that law can never fully ensure the responsible, 
public-interested use of governmental power if it neglects one side of that power. Through its 
requirements for transparency, benefit-cost analysis, and judicial review of new agency regulations, 
 
24 Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (2017); Aaron L. Nielson, Response, Confessions of an Anti-Administrativist, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2017); Mila 
Sohoni, Response: A Bureaucracy—If You Can Keep It, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2017). 
25 See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of ‘Too Much Law’, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2012) (“It is impossible to open a 
newspaper without seeing some such version of the claim that America suffers from “hyperlexis,” or the existence of “too 
much law.”); see also PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 26 (2011) 
(arguing that a proliferation of rules hampers business activity and the overall exercise of common sense); Bayless 
Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1976). For additional sources, see infra note 149 and 
accompanying text. 
26  See, e.g., CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL 
REGULATORY STATE 25 (2018). Even some scholars who recognize the benefits of regulation have emphasized the 
importance of reducing regulatory burdens. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER (2014). 
27 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393 (2015).  
28 CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF 
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE (2017), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments 
%202017.pdf; Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-Specific Regulations 
for All United States Industries and Federal Regulations, 1997-2012, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 109-123 (2017) [hereinafter 
RegData].  
29 See infra Part II. 
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for example, current administrative law tends to impose greater constraints on government agencies’ 
ability to impose obligations than on their ability to alleviate them.30  Swaths of administrative 
discretion to alleviate or eliminate obligations remain effectively unchecked. This bias inhibits 
administrative law’s ability to ensure agencies make well-considered alleviating decisions. When it 
comes to doling out waivers, for example, the absence of sufficient process and transparency 
requirements opens the door to a type of “unregulatory” capture. The comparative lack of judicial 
oversight of many unrules risks leaving certain alleviating decisions untested and poorly justified.31 
The result is a regulatory ship with a pronounced list. 
Our goal here is to bring unrules to the fore and to reorient debate over the regulatory state. 
To be sure, we are not the first ones to call attention to the existence of actions that governments can 
take to alleviate obligations, such as by issuing waivers and exemptions. Previous scholarship has 
identified and discussed certain types of unrules, and we acknowledge and build on this work in the 
sections that follow.32 Yet the predominant focus of the work of regulatory and administrative law 
scholars has been on agency discretion to impose legal obligations, too often overlooking the pervasive 
power that government possesses to alleviate obligations. 33 
In Part I, we present a unified taxonomy of unrules comprising the two main types of unrules: 
carveouts and dispensations. Although, as we will explain, important differences exist between 
carveouts and dispensations, both share in common the effect of limiting or alleviating obligations. 
Only by considering both types of unrules together, under a unified framework, is it possible to see 
the full extent to which the U.S. regulatory system comprises the alleviation of obligations as well as 
their imposition. 34  Indeed, we know of no previous work that has developed such a common 
framework to link together the two main types of unrules.35 We go on in Part I to show why greater 
recognition of obligation alleviation is necessary. Although we acknowledge that unrules, if used in a 
responsible manner, can render regulations less burdensome, more fair, and more efficient, we also 
 
30 See infra Part III. 
31 Such a bias in oversight should concern even those with libertarian commitments, as agencies can sometimes wield 
unrulemaking power in ways that enhance their power to impose obligations—such as by offering alleviation of some 
obligations in exchange for the acceptance of others the agency could not impose. See infra Part I.B.3. 
32  See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277 
(developing the concept of “administrative equity”); Jim Rossi, Waivers, Flexibility, and Reviewability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359 
(1997); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, The APA and the Back-End of Regulation: Procedures for Informal Adjudication, 
56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2004) (differentiat[ing] between what they call “front-end” and “back-end” adjustments”); Peter 
H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regulatory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 
DUKE L.J. 163 (1984) (examining “the pursuit of regulatory equity” through an “administrative ‘exceptions process.’”). 
33 See Aaron L. Nielson, Waivers, Exemptions, and Prosecutorial Discretion: An Examination of Agency Nonenforcement 
Practices, Final Report to ACUS 1 (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ACUS%20Waiver 
%20Report%20FINAL_0.pdf (noting that “agency nonenforcement of legal duties—through means such as waivers, 
exemptions, and prosecutorial discretion—has received less attention than agency efforts to see that legal duties are complied 
with”). In this respect, administrative law scholars appear to be not unlike other scholars. See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 871-872 (1991) (observing that many see exceptions as being “to law what electric windows are to 
automobiles—useful accessories but hardly central to the enterprise” and that “the exception is an invisible topic in legal 
theory”). For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
34 See infra Part III. 
35 The literature does recognize some types of carveouts, such as grandfather clauses. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard 
L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 
1681-95 (2007) (providing a comprehensive history of the EPA’s grandfathering of existing sources under the Clean Air Act’s 
New Source Performance Standards). But probably the most work on unrules among administrative law scholars has 
centered on what we call dispensations. See, e.g., Aman, Jr., supra note 32; Rossi, supra note 32. To our knowledge, no one 
has linked these two together to show how pervasive obligation alleviation is in the U.S. regulatory state. 
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emphasize how the use of unrules can undermine important health and safety protections, enable 
regulatory capture, and threaten the rule of law.  
In Part II, we show that unrules are ubiquitous. We report the results of computer-assisted 
content analysis of the Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, and U.S. Code indicating that 
unrules are a substantial and widespread feature of the federal regulatory law in the United States. 
Our analysis documents that, by different measures, there exists one obligation-alleviating word for 
approximately every five to six obligation-imposing words in federal law.36 We also explain why, for 
reasons related to the methodology we use and data availability, this ratio almost certainly understates 
substantially the prevalence of unrules. The analysis of dispensations in Part II, for example, almost 
exclusively focuses on language authorizing government agencies to grant dispensations. It is 
relatively rare for agencies to publish actual dispensations in the sources of law we analyze. 
Finally, in Part III, we show that, despite the importance and ubiquity of unrules, agencies are 
less constrained by administrative law doctrine when they exercise their power to alleviate the 
application, scope, or stringency of obligations than when they assert their power to impose 
obligations. Although the precise nature of procedural and other legal constraints varies across 
different unrules, in general the law requires government to proceed through more stringent 
procedural steps before imposing regulatory obligations on private parties than when alleviating 
them.37 Consequently, a major form of governmental discretion remains not only relatively hidden 
from view, but also less encumbered by legal constraints designed to ensure public-interested exercise 
of government power. Recognition of the ubiquity of unrules points toward the need to reorient both 
doctrine and scholarship to bring agencies’ power to alleviate obligations more squarely into the 
center of prevailing debates over the regulatory state. 
 
I. THE HIDDEN WORLD OF UNRULES 
 
When any governmental authority, whether a legislature or an administrative agency, creates 
new law, it imposes a new legal obligation—or, simply put, it creates a rule.38 A rule consists of 
multiple components. One component defines the rule’s targets or obligatees—that is, the class of 
individuals or entities upon which an obligation is imposed.39 The regulatory target itself can be 
 
36 See infra Part II. 
37 Although Parts I and II of this Article make clear that rules and unrules can be adopted by Congress or by administrative 
agencies, given the salience of agencies in imposing and alleviating obligations as part of their implementation of statutory 
schemes, our focus in Part III is on administrative agencies’ use of unrules—the domain of administrative law. Cf. Susan 
Webb Yackee, The Politics of Rulemaking in the United States, 22 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 37, 39 (2019) (“Given the pervasiveness 
of rulemaking, US public policymaking may be better conceived of as chiefly regulatory, rather than chiefly legislative.”). 
38  Although we use the term rule in this article to refer to legal obligations, our focus and terminology should be 
distinguished from that which may be found in at least two other contexts. First, our use of the term rule is not limited to 
those obligations imposed by administrative agencies, as the word “rule” is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. 
5 U.S.C. §551(4). We mean rule to refer to any prescriptive or proscriptive statement imposing a legal obligation. Many 
such obligations are indeed adopted by administrative agencies—and when we do mean to limit our meaning just to agency 
rules we generally use the term regulations. But rules are also adopted by legislatures and courts as well. Second, we do not 
mean to limit our use of the word rule to its meaning in legal scholars’ rules-versus-standards debate. See generally Pierre 
J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). Legal obligations can be tightly or loosely specified, but they 
are still obligations—and, hence, both rules and standards are rules in the sense we mean here.  
39 Other components include the nature of the command—i.e., mandate or prohibition—the rule imposes on its target and 
the potential consequences for violating that command. See Cary Coglianese, Regulation’s Four Core Components, REG. REV. 
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defined by multiple criteria, such as the line of business or activities in which targeted entities engage, 
the size of these entities, and their age or the duration of their relevant activities. 40  Another 
component—the rule’s command—articulates what the target must do or refrain from doing, or what 
outcome it must achieve or avoid. Commands or legal duties themselves can comprise multiple facets 
and prove at times quite complex. 41  That complexity can increase further due to other rule 
components that provide conditions under which a legal command will apply—or under which 
distinct commands will apply. 
Each of a rule’s components—its defined scope, command, and conditions—affords a rule’s 
creator the opportunity to calibrate a rule to fit particular problems and circumstances.42 But these 
components also mean that a regulator—either when designing a rule or in seeking to apply or enforce 
it—has an opportunity to leave some entities or individuals outside the scope of a rule, to lessen its 
commands, or to modify its conditions. Such an opportunity to circumscribe or lighten legal 
obligations, or to exempt some individuals, business firms, or other relevant private or public entities 
from a rule’s application, would constitute what we refer to as an obligation alleviation—or an unrule. 
Unrules can be thought of as akin to the holes in a block of regulatory Swiss cheese, with rules being 
the cheese itself. Just as with Swiss cheese, the rules have real substance, as they are backed with the 
force of the state. But the holes are also constitutive of what a regulatory system means for business 
and society—and how effective, costly, and fair that system can be.43 
In this Part, we present a taxonomy of unrules that includes two types of unrules—carveouts 
and dispensations—and we illustrate each with examples from existing law. Then we discuss the 
 
(Sept. 17, 2012), https://www.theregreview.org/2012/09/17/regulations-four-core-components/; see also FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING 23 (1991) 
(analyzing rules by “disassembling such rules to observe their characteristic structure and component parts”). An 
appreciation of the components of legal rules can be traced back to the early legal lexiconic work of Wesley Hohfeld. See 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
40 Although many rules target businesses and other private actors, such as individuals and nonprofit organizations, rules 
target governmental entities as well. Statutory or regulatory provisions that obligate administrative agencies to follow 
specified procedures or to provide certain public benefits to qualified applicants are also rules. 
41 For further discussion of different types of legal commands and how they affect the design of rules, see NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI., DESIGNING SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR HIGH-HAZARD INDUSTRIES, ch. 2 (2018), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24907 
/designing-safety-regulations-for-high-hazard-industries.  
42 Of course, rule creators have to make all of these calibration decisions under conditions of uncertainty, which greatly 
complicates the degree to which rules can be precisely fitted to particular problems and circumstances. See Adam I. 
Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 1321, 1327 (2016). 
43 Some legal theorists have suggested that these “holes” in rules are inevitable. See, e.g, Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009) (drawing on Carl Schmitt’s theory of the “exception” to argue that 
underspecification in the law is inevitable); Schauer, Exceptions, supra note 33, at 874-875 (arguing that the limits of 
language make exceptions to rules inevitable); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 962 (1995) 
(noting that it is “familiar to find rules that have explicit or implicit exceptions for cases of necessity or emergency,” and 
“unfamiliar to find rules without any such exceptions”). That being said, to state that unrules are inevitable is not to 
commit to a position of whether they are intrinsic (or internal) to the rule itself in a philosophical sense. See, e.g., Claire 
Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, 19 QUINN. L. REV. 505, 508-509 (2000) (distinguishing internal 
“qualifications” from “exceptions,” the latter of which are external to the rule). Nor does it mean that every way that a rule 
is limited should be thought of as an unrule. Limitations on a rule’s scope or applicability that have nothing to do with 
the underlying purpose of the rule are inevitable, but they would not reasonably be considered unrules. For instance, a 
rule that imposes obligations on automobile manufacturers to build cars that meet brake safety standards does not also 
contain the obligation that banks retain adequate capital reserves. Such irrelevant limitations are not unrules, as we define 
them. 
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purposes that can be served by both types of unrules, as well as the risks that they pose in terms of 
regulatory ineffectiveness, unfairness, and the undermining of the rule of law. 
 
A. A Unified Taxonomy of Unrules 
 
At the outset, it is helpful to make three additional points to clarify further what we mean by 
unrules. First, unrules can be found in any source of law, statutes as well as agency regulations. 
Although the latter sources are also referred to as agency “rules,” we generally reserve the term rule 
in this article to refer to any kind of legal instrument that imposes a legal obligation. Unless otherwise 
indicated, we refer to agency-adopted rules as regulations. That said, while we are interested in 
obligation alleviation as a general feature of government, we are particularly interested in it as a 
feature of the administrative arm of government. Given that agencies impose many more rules than 
does Congress, they also possess greater opportunity to deploy unrules—and thus administrative law 
should be more attentive to how agencies exercise their discretion to issue unrules.  
Second, unrules are the opposite of rules in that they lift, limit, or dispense with an obligation, 
rather than impose one. They are not the opposite of rules merely because they do not bind, but 
because they actually alleviate. We mention this because much has been written by scholars over the 
years about non-binding norms—whether called guidance or soft law.44 In a certain sense, these soft 
legal tools could plausibly be thought of as the opposite of rules as well, simply because they are non-
binding. And, indeed, there may even be some overlap between unrules and guidance, at least where 
guidance constructively alleviates obligations, as it might with no-action letters and other forms of 
soft law that promise the nonenforcement of the law. What has made guidance a controversial tool 
in the administrative arsenal, though, is not its potential for alleviating the effects of obligations, but 
rather its use by agencies to pursue regulatory goals by constructively imposing obligations without 
following the normal processes for promulgating rules or orders.45 That is not our concern here. 
When we focus on unrules, we mean to refer to the actual lifting of otherwise applicable obligations—
not the establishment of non-binding norms.  
Finally, just like rules, unrules can apply both to private actors or entities as well as public 
actors or entities. Federal efforts to pursue President Donald Trump’s border wall with Mexico, for 
example, have benefited from an unrule that alleviated obligations that would ordinarily have been 
imposed on government construction projects.46 The Secretary of Homeland Security has waived 
more than two dozen otherwise applicable laws, including those that would have normally demanded 
thorough environmental reviews of the new construction projects. 47  Just as unrules alleviating 
 
44 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE 
J. ON REG. 165, 167 (2019); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
573 (2008). 
45 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them 
to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1372 (1992); Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An 
Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. REG. 165, 168 (2019). 
46 Proclamation 9844, Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 4,949 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/20/2019-03011/declaring-a-national-
emergency-concerning-the-southern-border-of-the-united-states. 
47 The REAL ID Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to “waive all legal requirements . . . [as] necessary to 
ensure expeditious construction” of a border wall. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, § 102, 119 
Stat. 231, 306 (2005). In January 2018, the Secretary of Homeland Security waived the application of the National 
Environmental Policy Act and other laws. Determination Pursuant to Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as Amended, 83 Fed. Reg. 3,012, 3,013 (Jan. 22, 2018). 
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private entities’ obligations can be consequential, so too can unrules vis-à-vis governmental entities. 
In the absence of the environmental reviews normally required for government construction 
projects, for example, some of the Trump Administration’s wall sections have created serious erosion 
problems, prompting officials to leave certain gates open to allow water to pass through—but 
defeating whatever function these walls served in deterring illegal entry into the United States.48 
Having clarified further what we mean by unrules, we now turn to classifying them. In the 
two subsections to follow, we elaborate the two types of unrules: carveouts and dispensations. 
Understanding these types of unrules is essential for both seeing the extent of unrules in regulatory 
law (the aim of Part II of this Article) and understanding how administrative law currently tends to 
provide less oversight of unrules (the aim of Part III).  
At the same time as we distinguish carveouts from dispensations in the following sections, it 
is important not to lose sight of what they share in common: they both alleviate obligations. 
Obligation alleviation is the sine qua non of unrules, and it is why we treat these two types of regulatory 
decisions as part of the same phenomenon. What distinguishes carveouts and dispensations from 
each other concerns their scope of application and their timing. These differences are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Carveouts apply on a categorical basis to any eligible person or entity meeting the criteria or 
conditions for obligation alleviation, while dispensations are granted on a case-by-case basis. By and 
large, this diffference between the two unrules tracks the distinction between the two types of agency 
actions in administrative law: rules versus orders.49 Rules, in the sense of agency regulations, impose 
obligations generally on any individuals or entities falling into the category covered by the rule and 
its conditions.50  Orders, by contrast, follow an adjudicatory process and then can result in the 
imposition of an obligation only on a specified set of individuals or entities. 51  Carveouts and 
dispensations have a parallel scope—with carveouts applying generally and dispensations applying 
specifically—only instead of imposing obligations, they each avoid or alleviate obligations. 
Carveouts and dispensations can also be distinguished based on their timing. Carveouts are 
are put in place at the time a rule is written or amended. They appear within the very same text that  
 
48 Nick Miroff, Trump’s Border Wall, Vulnerable to Flash Floods, Needs Large Storm Gates Left Open for Months, Wash. Post. 
(Jan 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trumps-border-wall-vulnerable-to-flash-floods-needs-
large-storm-gates-left-open-for-months/2020/01/30/be709346-3710-11ea-bb7b-265f4554af6d_story.html 
49 See 5 U.S.C. § 551. In administrative law, the distinction between rules and orders is widely understood to hinge on the 
generalized effect of a rule on more than one individual or entity, contrasting with an order that affects particular 
individuals or entities. See Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of “Rule,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1077, 1080 (2004) (explaining the centrality of generality to the definition of a rule and citing the canonical Supreme 
Court case to that effect, Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)). The APA’s parallel 
definitions of rules and orders have generated much confusion because of the definition of a rule’s reference to the “whole 
or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect”—a definition that seems in tension 
with the Court’s understanding of the distinction between rules and adjudications, and which suggests that it is “future 
effect” which actually distinguishes rules from orders. Id. at 1077-78 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6)). According to some, 
considering future effect to be central to the distinction is an unfortunate mistake. Id. at 1079. Our distinction between 
carveouts and dispensations has its parallels with both of these dimensions—generality and timing—and at least roughly 
matches, at a conceptual level, the general administrative law understanding of the distinction between rules and orders. 
We make the comparison with rules and orders purely for heuristic reasons. Agencies must use one or the other action 
in § 551—rule or order—to alleviate obligations as much as to impose them. A carveout will be part of a § 551 rule, while 
a dispensation will be executed as an order. 
50 See Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Southern Railway 
v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933). 
51 See id. 
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TABLE 1: FEATURES OF UNRULES 
 
 Carveouts Dispensations 
Application Categorical Case-by-case 
Timing 
At the time of the imposition of a 
obligation (e.g., adoption or amendment 
of a regulation)  
After the imposition of a obligation 
(e.g., after the adoption or amendment 
of a regulation)  
 
 
also imposes an obligation. By contrast, dispensations arise later, after the creation of a rule or its 
amendment. A dispensation grants a special status to an individual or entity whereby an otherwise 
applicable, previously established obligation no longer applies. 
To illustrate our unrules taxonomy, we provide examples of each in the sections to follow. 
Some of these examples are explicit, as when carveouts are stated as express exemptions in statutes 
and regulations or when dispensations are memorialized in waivers or no-action letters. But 
obligation alleviation can also take place implicitly or constructively, such as when agencies use their 
discretion not to enforce a regulation against a specific entity (a constructive dispensation) or when 
an agency leaves a natural target for obligation out of the scope of a regulation without drawing 
attention to that decision in the regulatory text (a constructive carveout).52  Of course, as with many 
legal distinctions, it may be possible to find a few examples that could blur the boundaries between 
carveouts and dispensations. In this respect, the two types of unrules also share another characteristic 
in parallel with the two types of agency action used to impose obligations (namely, rules and orders), 
the differences between which can sometimes vex law students. Notwithstanding the possibility of 
an occasional example challenging the distinction between the two types of unrules, our unified 
taxonomy does help reveal the extent to which the power of obligation alleviation runs through the 
regulatory state and the ways in which administrative law governs the exercise of that power.   
 
1. Carveouts 
 
Carveouts, as noted, are explicit or implicit exceptions to regulatory obligations for certain 
groups of individuals, types of firms, time periods, or classes of activities which are “baked into” the 
source of rules themselves. They serve to limit the scope or applicability of obligations that otherwise 
would have applied to entities or activities falling within the coverage of a rule.53 Sometimes these 
targets are exempted entirely from a rule; other times they are subject to less onerous obligations. In 
 
52 These kinds of constructive unrules present a special challenge for administrative law, which generally is triggered 
when an agency formalizes an action by publishing it in a source of binding law. See infra Part III. 
53 Carveouts are thus deregulatory in the sense that, like all unrules, they alleviate obligations. Yet carveouts still keep the 
underlying regulatory obligation intact for at least some entities or under some circumstances. By contrast, what is 
commonly referred to as “deregulation” usually refers to the wholesale repeal or reconfiguration of existing obligations. 
See generally MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (2001) (chronicling economic 
deregulation of the air transport, trucking, and telecommunications sectors in the 1970s); ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM 
DEREGULATION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH (2003) (reviewing the deregulation of the 
airline and telecommunications industries). 
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either case, because carveouts are embedded within a rule, any entities whose characteristics or activities 
fall within the domain of a carveout can be assured that their obligations have been alleviated. 
On some level, every rule necessarily contains what could perhaps be thought of as a carveout. 
The definition of a rule’s various components must demarcate the boundaries of the rule which determine 
to whom (and what and when) the rule applies—and by extension to those (and what and when) it does 
not apply.54 Other times, carveouts serve to limit the scope of the rule in ways that are not constitutive of 
or intrinsic to the motivating purpose of the rule—and thus they may even serve to undermine the goal 
of the rule. For instance, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included provisions expressly exempting waste 
fluids produced during hydraulic fracturing for natural gas from what otherwise would have been 
obligations imposed on the handling of these pollutants under the Clean Water Act, Safe Drinking Water 
Act, and federal hazardous waste laws.55 These carveouts for hydraulic fracturing fluid—widely referred 
to as the Halliburton loophole—did not come into existence because hydraulic fracturing fluids are not 
harmful to drinking water or the environment. Instead, they came into existence due to lobbying pressure 
by producers of natural gas.56 
The Halliburton loophole also illustrates how carveouts can arise after a rule is initially put into 
place. Although carveouts can be embedded within the original source of a rule (e.g., statute or regulation), 
they can also be added later through amendments that narrow a rule’s scope or coverage.57 Many of the 
regulatory obligations imposed under the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act and its resulting regulations initially 
applied to all banks, but in 2018 Congress amended the act to carve out smaller community banks from 
some of the Act’s capital reserve requirements. 58  
Carveouts can take myriad different forms. For instance, when various state public health orders 
during the COVID-19 crisis obligated many businesses to shut down their operations, they explicitly 
contained carveouts for those businesses that provided “essential services.”59 When the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) imposed a mandate that businesses with 50 or more full-time employees provide health care 
insurance for their employees, it necessarily carved businesses with fewer than 50 employees out of the 
statute’s obligation.60 When Congress passed the Clean Air Act of 1970, it aimed to clean up the pollution 
that factories had been spewing into the air at will, but the Act provided that certain pollution-reduction 
 
54 See supra note 38-43 and accompanying text. The boundaries contained in the rule might be thought distinct from 
justified reasons to depart from the strict meaning of the rule. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 43, at 508-509 
(distinguishing “qualifications” internal to a rule from “exceptions” that are external).  
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
56 See Charles Davis, The Politics of “Fracking”: Regulating Natural Gas Drilling Practices in Colorado and Texas, 29 REV. OF 
POL’Y RES. 177, 182 (2012). 
57 For examples of amendments in the context of administrative rulemaking, see Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas 
McGarity, & Lisa Peters, Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183 (2017) (demonstrating that agencies frequently 
revisit existing regulations to adapt them to changing circumstances and at times to dole out regulatory relief—or what 
we call obligation alleviation). 
58 See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1295.  
59 See, e.g., Fl. Exec. Order No. 20-91 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-
91-compressed.pdf; Florida Division of Emergency Management, Memorandum Re: Additions of Essential Services to 
the List Under EO 20-91, https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Essential-Services-Additions-EO-20-
91.pdf. For related discussion, see Cary Coglianese, Obligation Alleviation During the COVID-19 Crisis, REG. REV. (April 20, 
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/20/coglianese-obligation-alleviation-during-covid-19-crisis/. 
60 26 U.S.C. § 4980H, Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage. On small business exemptions 
more generally, see RAND Institute, Is Special Regulatory Treatment for Small Businesses Working as Intended, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9298/index1.html (“[S]mall businesses often receive special regulatory 
treatment, such as exemptions from legislation or extended deadlines for compliance.”). 
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obligations imposed under the law would apply only to new or significantly modified industrial operations, 
not to existing facilities that also polluted the air.61 
Lawmakers can adopt carveouts, not merely with respect to regulatory targets, but also with respect 
to the applicable time periods covered by a rule. Many rules will include phase-in periods when they are first 
adopted, and the length of these periods is an important component in defining, as well as alleviating, a rule’s 
obligations. For example, in 2018, the Trump Administration issued a regulation that extended the original 
compliance deadlines contained in an EPA coal ash disposal regulation adopted in the wake of the 2008 TVA 
Kingston coal disaster.62 
Carveouts are often explicitly stated in a statute or regulation, as with each of the examples we have 
just presented. But they can also be implicitly inferred from a rule’s language or context.63 For example, an 
EPA regulation prohibiting hospital employees from disposing of unused medicines by flushing them down 
the toilet or drain—a practice that raises concern about contaminating drinking water supplies—is written so 
that it applies only to those drugs considered “hazardous waste.”64  Someone reading that rule may not 
appreciate that, in reality, drugs classified as hazardous waste amount to only a small fraction of all drugs.65 
But the carveout is still there, even though the rule is not expressly written as having granted an exemption 
to the vast majority of drugs. In practice, hospital workers continue to flush most drugs down the drain, just 
as the carveout permits.66 
To summarize, carveouts can be implicit or explicit, embedded in an original rule or adopted at a later 
time as an amendment or in a separate nonenforcement policy. Regardless of form, they categorically alleviate 
obligations for the targets or activities falling outside the scope of the rule or into an exempted category. 
 
2. Dispensations 
 
Dispensations, by contrast, involve the case-by-case suspension of otherwise applicable and pre-
existing obligations for particular individuals or entities. 67  Dispensations may grant individualized 
 
61 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 111, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1683 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
7411). See generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and 
Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681-95 (2007) (providing a comprehensive history of the EPA’s 
grandfathering of existing sources under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards).  
62 Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities; 
Amendments to the National Criteria (Phase One, Part One), 83 Fed. Reg. 36,440-36,444 (Jul. 30, 2018). 
63 Schauer, supra note 33, at 874 (“Where the language in which the rule is written contains a word or a familiar phrase 
that itself excludes what the drafters wish to exclude from the scope of the rule, no exception is necessary.”). We recognize 
as well the possibility that, in any hard case, what might otherwise be thought to be the force of a rule might give way to 
unwritten principles or entirely separate sets of values not explicitly accounted for in the rule’s text. For a related 
philosophical and jurisprudential literature on the defeasibility of rules, see, e.g., LUIS DUARTE D'ALMEIDA, ALLOWING FOR 
EXCEPTIONS: A THEORY OF DEFENCES AND DEFEASIBILITY IN LAW (2015); JORDI FERRER BELTRAN AND GIOVANNI 
BATTISTA RATTI, EDS., THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (2012).  
64 Management Standards for Hazardous Waste Pharmaceuticals and Amendment to the P075 Listing for Nicotine, 
84 Fed. Reg. 5,816, 5,859 (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/22/2019-01298/ 
management-standards-for-hazardous-waste-pharmaceuticals-and-amendment-to-the-p075-listing-for (declining to 
extend the prohibition of disposal to all pharmaceuticals rather than just those deemed hazardous waste). 
65 Susan Scutti, When Hospitals Pour Drugs Down the Drain,, CNN (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/28/ 
health/water-pharmaceutical-contaminants-epa/index.html. 
66 Id. 
67 Although here we mainly focus on unrules applicable to private individuals and businesses, we note that dispensations 
awarded to states and localities still can have indirect—but perhaps no less significant—ramifications for private individuals 
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extensions of compliance deadlines or even waive the application of obligations entirely. They do not 
alter the underlying rule itself, but rather affect whether or how the rule’s obligation applies to a 
discrete regulatory target.68 
For the particular individual or entity covered by a dispensation, the need to comply with an 
otherwise applicable obligation disappears, although the obligation continues on for all other 
individuals or entities subject to it. Dispensations come under numerous labels, such as “waivers,” 
“exceptions,”69 “exemptions,”70 “variances,”71 “licenses,”72 or “no-action letters,”73 but the label is less 
important than the function of relieving a specific individual’s or entity’s duty to comply with an 
existing regulation. 
Examples of dispensations abound across every domain of regulatory law, not infrequently in 
response to unusual circumstances, emergency situations, changed conditions, or new technologies.74 
In response to the novel coronavirus pandemic in 2020, for example, the Food and Drug 
Administration issued a variety of “emergency use authorizations” related to viral testing, treatments, 
 
and businesses. An important wrinkle to acknowledge is that sometimes unrules applied to states may allow them to impose 
more stringent burdens on private entities. This was the case when the EPA granted California a waiver from the ban on 
state-imposed motor vehicle emissions standards more stringent than federal Clean Air Act standards. See California State 
Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 
32,744 (Jul. 8, 2009). Similarly, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has attempted to use its authority under 
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act to grant states waivers to impose employment conditions and other eligibility 
burdens on Medicaid beneficiaries. See, e.g., Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Re: Opportunities to Promote Work and Community Engagement Among Medicaid Beneficiaries (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf.  
68 We recognize, of course, that carveouts can be highly particularized too—at times excluding from a rule’s coverage just 
a single entity. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 47 n. 4 (1969) (discussing how laws can be written to be highly 
particularized). But we differentiate here that kind of carveout from a dispensation because the former is embedded in or 
becomes part of the source of the rule itself. Moreover, unless a particularized carveout expressly names a specific 
individual or entity, it may be possible that in the future other entities may come to fit within the seemingly particularized 
carveout, making it a generalized carveout over time. Still, the very possibility of a highly particularized carveout that 
looks virtually identical to a dispensation, save for the fact that the former is contained in the original authoritative source 
of the rule (or its amendment), reinforces our point that both carveouts and dispensations are doing the same thing—
alleviating obligations—and should be considered under a unified framework.  
69 7 C.F.R. § 767.251 (allowing the USDA to grant “an exception to any regulatory requirement or policy of this part” on 
an “individual case basis”). 
70 50 C.F.R. § 660.14 (providing that a fishing vessel may be exempt from operating a “mobile transceiver unit” under 
certain conditions). 
71 21 C.F.R. § 1010.4 (providing that the Director for the Center for Devices and Radiological Health in the FDA “may 
grant a variance from one or more provisions of any performance standard” for radiological devices).  
72 31 CFR § 501.801 (providing that “[t]ransactions subject to the prohibitions contained in this chapter, or to prohibitions 
the implementation and administration of which have been otherwise delegated to the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets 
Control] Director, that are not authorized by general license may be effected only under specific license.”). 
73  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Response of the Division of Corporation Finance Re: TurnKey Jet, Inc., (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm. 
74 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 272 (2013) (“Waiver is a 
long-standing administrative power—and not only when the requirement that is being waived is a regulation of the 
agency’s own making.”). Waivers, or what we call dispensations (including the exercise of regulatory discretion), can 
alleviate statutory requirements, see id.; Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548 (2016), or they 
can alleviate regulatory requirements previously imposed by an agency through rulemaking, see Nielson, supra note 33. 
This Article does not draw any fundamental distinction between the object of the dispensation, although the literature 
suggests that agency dispensations of statutory requirements may raise constitutional objections that dispensations of 
regulations do not raise. 
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and vaccines.75 The Federal Aviation Administration has granted waivers from its drone regulations 
when the agency has found that a drone operator has proposed an alternative means of operation just 
as safe as the ones specified in the rules.76 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued 
a “no-action letter” for a digital coin offering under the Securities and Exchange Act, promising non-
enforcement of securities laws to a company seeking to offer a new cryptocurrency.77  
In many policy domains, the same statute that delegates to an administrative agency the 
authority to impose regulatory obligations will also grant it the authority to waive obligations under 
appropriate circumstances.78 Although delegations of obligation-imposition power are supposed to 
be cabined by an “intelligible principle” under the nondelegation doctrine,79  statutory provisions 
authorizing dispensations often lack any meaningful principle at all. Sometimes authorizations of 
dispensation authority sweep so broadly that they, at least theoretically, allow agencies to waive any 
regulatory provision. For example, federal statutes directing the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to develop demonstration projects for opioid disorder treatment provide that the “Secretary 
may waive any provision of this subchapter as may be necessary to carry out the Program under this 
section.”80 Such is also the case with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which has 
decreed that any provision in the Commission’s rules “may be suspended, revoked, amended, or 
waived for good cause shown.”81 
In exercising their dispensation authority, agencies sometimes expect recipients of 
dispensations to have applied or petitioned for obligation alleviation.82 Yet it is also possible for 
 
75 See, e.g., Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, FDA, to Robert R. Redfield, Director, CDC (July 2, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/139744/download (granting a request for emergency use of a “multiplexed nucleic acid test 
for simultaneous qualitative detection and differentiation of SARS-CoV-2” under 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3).  
76 83 Fed. Reg. 28,528 (June 20, 2018). 
77 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Response of the Division of Corporation Finance Re: TurnKey Jet, Inc., (Apr. 3, 2019), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm. For general background on the 
issues presented by blockchain and digital coin offerings under the Securities and Exchange Act, see Shaanan Cohney, 
David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff, & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019). 
78 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (“Except as provided in subsection (b)(4) or (c), the Secretary [of Education] may waive any 
statutory or regulatory requirement of this chapter for which a waiver request is submitted to the Secretary pursuant to this 
subsection.”); 49 U.S.C. § 31315 (“Upon receipt of a request pursuant to this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation may 
grant to a person or class of persons an exemption from a regulation prescribed under this chapter or section 31136 if the 
Secretary finds such exemption would likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level that would 
be achieved absent such exemption.”); 47 U.S.C. § 613 (“The [Federal Communications] Commission may delay or waive the 
regulation promulgated under subparagraph (A) to the extent the Commission finds that the application of the regulation to 
live video programming delivered using Internet protocol with captions after the effective date of such regulations would be 
economically burdensome to providers of video programming or program owners.”). 
79 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-6(i). 
81 47 C.F.R. § 1.3; see also Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the FCC 
“may exercise its discretion to waive a rule where particular facts would make strict compliance inconsistent with the 
public interest” (citing WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
82 For instance, oil and gas pipeline operators can apply for “special permits” from the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA) that waive or modify the usual pipeline safety requirements. Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, Special Permits and State Waivers Overview, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/ special- permits-state-waivers/special-permits-and-state-
waivers-overview (last accessed Feb. 17, 2020). Likewise, firms that make small public offerings of stock can apply for 
“waivers” from the Securities and Exchange Commission from normal registration requirements. See Conditional Small 
Issues Exemption Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Regulation A), 84 Fed. Reg. 520 (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www. 
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agencies to act on their own accord to dispense with a requirement for a specific entity by simply not 
enforcing it. 83  Agencies need no special statutory authorization for decisions not to enforce 
obligations against specific individuals or entities, as the Supreme Court has treated that authority as 
an inherently discretionary administrative power.84 
Dispensations also take the form of individualized non-enforcement decisions that agency 
officials make every day in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion.85  The exercise of such 
discretion fails to provide regulated targets with any written assurance that the government will 
continue to turn a blind eye to noncompliance. But as a practical matter, it may be enough to function 
just as any other kind of dispensation. Such dispensations can work to alleviate particular individuals 
or entities from their felt obligations to behave in compliance with otherwise applicable law.86 
However, when government agencies announce that they will forgo enforcement of rules on 
an “across-the-board” basis against certain classes of regulated targets or for a certain period of time, 
rather than on a case-by-case basis, these decisions begin to blur the boundaries between 
dispensations and carveouts.87 The Obama Administration, for instance, heavily publicized its across-
the-board decision to refrain from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act and associated 
regulations when states de-criminalized or legalized recreational cannabis. 88  That same 
administration also declined to enforce immigration laws against non-citizens who were brought to 
the United States as children through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 
program. 89  Similar across-the-board nonenforcement policies have been announced during the 
Trump Administration.90  For instance, after failing to win congressional support to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act, the Trump Administration simply abandoned its enforcement of the law’s 
mandate that individuals purchase health insurance.91  In the opening months of the COVID-19 
 
federalregister.gov/documents/2019/01/ 31/2018-27980/condition-small-issues-exemption-under-the-securities-act-
of-1933-regulation-a; see also Division of Corporation Finance, Waivers of Disqualification under Regulation A and Rules 505 
and 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ 
disqualification-waivers.shtml. 
83 See Nielson, supra note 33. 
84 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). 
85 Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911, 1923 (2016) (“There are literally hundreds, if not thousands, of nonenforcement decisions of one 
kind or another made by executive officials and line agents every single day.”); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969) (discussing the extensive adjudicatory discretion exercised by 
administrative agencies).  
86 For the now-canonical discussion of regulators’ strategic deployment of such enforcement discretion, see IAN AYRES 
AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
87 Elsewhere, one of us has articulated such non-enforcement policies as an example of an executive power to defer—or 
to use “inaction as a lever to achieve policy outcomes.” Cary Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, The Bounds of Executive 
Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2016). 
88 Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
289, 291 (2015). 
89 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream on: The Obama Administration's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream 
Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783 (2013). 
90 See Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 13, 14 (2018) (“Agencies across the federal government have delayed the effective dates, and in some cases the 
compliance dates, of dozens of final rules.”). 
91 Haeyoun Park & Margot Sanger-Katz, 4 Ways Trump Is Weakening Obamacare, Even After Repeal Plan’s Failure, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/19/us/what-trump-can-do-to-let-obamacare-
fail.html (“While Mr. Trump cannot eliminate the mandate, as Republicans in Congress sought to do, the Internal Revenue 
 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 15 
 
pandemic and its concommitant economic disruption, the Administration announced that it was 
temporarily suspending enforcement across the board for a range of environmental regulatory 
obligations.92  
The announcement of policies like these, which grant a general pass from enforcement, even 
if only for a specific group of regulated entities or for a limited time period, are similar to carveouts 
in that they apply categorically, rather than on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, these non-
enforcement policies are like dispensations in that they apply after a rule’s adoption and do not 
explicitly amend it. Despite not expressly lifting a legal obligation, as most carveouts do, they do 
effectively alleviate the obligation, putting regulated targets in the same basic position as if the rule 
itself had been expressly changed. As one observer of regulatory policy has commented, “[y]ou can 
make a rule, but if you don’t enforce the rule, it’s almost like the rule doesn’t exist.”93 
 
B. The Risks of Unrules 
 
Whatever their particular manifestations, carveouts and dispensations both serve to alleviate 
obligations—and both are often needed to make rules more effective, efficient, and fair. Rules, after 
all, are generalizations, and the assumptions and preconditions underlying these generalizations do 
not always fit the complex and dynamic world to which rules are applied.94 Unrules thus help rules 
accommodate the world in a way that can help them better fulfill the underlying purpose that 
motivated the imposition of obligations in the first place. 
In addition, rules often aim to serve multiple purposes, which necessitates tailoring them in a 
way that balances among different values. Sometimes this means rules must be fine-tuned or 
adjusted—such as when child-resistant packaging rules were amended to impose an obligation to 
make sure that such packaging will not allow children to open the bottles of medicines or household 
cleaners while still allowing adults to open them.95 When the FCC granted Google a waiver allowing 
its Soli sensors (a radar-based motion sensor) to operate at higher power levels than normally allowed 
by rules designed to protect against interference to other users of radio spectrum, it did so in part to 
“help people with mobility, speech, or tactile impairments” by enabling them to control devices such 
as smart phones remotely through “touchless hand gesture technology.”96 
Carveouts or dispensations can help in balancing different objectives or reconciling 
competing policy preferences. They can help make operational what Cass Sunstein has called the 
 
Service has said it will continue accepting tax returns that do not say whether a filer has been uninsured, weakening its 
enforcement of the provision.”). See also Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays, supra note 90, at 14 (“Agencies across the federal 
government have delayed the effective dates, and in some cases the compliance dates, of dozens of final rules.”). 
92  Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program, UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-03/documents/ 
oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf.   
93 See Brittany Knotts, Grace Tatter, & Anthony Brooks, Environmental Regulations Are Being Rolled Back. In A Pandemic, 
What Does That Mean For Public Health? WBUR ON POINT (Jul. 1, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2020/07/01/ 
environmental-regulations-under-attack-health (quoting Kendra Pierre-Louis). 
94 Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, Regulation by Generalization, 1 REG. & GOV. 68 (2007); Muchmore, supra note 42. 
95 Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Performance-Based Regulation, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 525, 555-556 (2017). 
96  Rita Liao, FCC Greenlights Soli, Google’s Radar-Based Gesture Tech, Tech Crunch (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/02/us-fcc-approves-google-soli-project/. The FCC granted Google this waiver only after 
determining that the Soli sensors would pose “minimal potential of causing harmful interference to other spectrum users.” Id. 
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“incompletely theorized agreements” that often underlie the law’s response to contentious issues.97 
For example, rules restricting access to abortions almost invariably contain exceptions for when 
pregnancy results from a sexual assault or incest—a way that anti-abortion advocates pursue the 
limitations on abortions they favor while accommodating a societal consensus that some 
circumstances warrant alleviation of legal obligations to avoid administering abortions.98 
For these reasons, unrules are essential for any system of rules to fit varied and changing 
political, social, and economic circumstances. 99  Unrules can provide much-needed flexibility to 
minimize unnecessary burdens on regulated entities and undesirable side effects,100 to encourage and 
manage technological innovation,101 and to enable regulators to conserve their limited resources.102 
They may also at times render regulation fairer and more equitable. Sometimes full compliance with 
a rule would be infeasible or disproportionately costly for certain regulated parties.103 If a rule is 
imposed rigidly and uniformly under all circumstances in which it applies, even when the regulated 
parties attempt in good faith to comply with the rule, it may even undermine regulation’s 
legitimacy104 and thereby impede compliance.105 
But unrules can also be misused. Perhaps it is because of the positive role that unrules can play 
in reducing costs and avoiding counterproductive effects that their risks have not received more 
attention by legal scholars. Yet we should have no illusions about unrules; they are not an unalloyed 
 
97 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). The flexibility provided by 
unrules may in some cases render it less necessary for agencies to promulgate new regulations. Perhaps the ubiquity of 
unrules that we document in Part II helps to explain why regulatory provisions are not amended more frequently. See 
Daniel Byler, Beth Flores, & Jason Lewris, Using Advanced Analytics to Drive Regulatory Reform, DELOITTE CENTER FOR 
GOVERNMENT INSIGHTS 6 (2017) (finding that around two-thirds of sections of the CFR have never been updated). But 
see Wagner et al., supra note 57, at 202 (finding that nearly three-quarters of the rules examined “were revised by the 
agency at least once and typically multiple times”). 
98 Law and Policy Guide: Rape and Incest Exceptions, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, https://reproductiverights.org/law-
and-policy-guide-rape-and-incest (last accessed Feb. 10, 2020). 
99 Rossi, supra note 32, at 1363 (noting that the possibility of waiving requirements “allows agencies to adapt regulation 
to contemporary technological and financial circumstances.”); Aaron L. Nielson & Jennifer Nou, How Agencies Should Use 
Waivers and Exemptions, REG. REV. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/03/09/nielson-nou-agencies-
waivers-exemptions/ (noting that “agencies often need to grant flexibility when circumstances require,” such as in 
emergencies or in connection with new technologies). 
100 See Aman, Jr., supra note 32, at 294-311 (distinguishing among several different types of “hardship exceptions” and 
“fairness exceptions”); see also ACUS, Regulatory Waivers and Exemptions, Recommendation 2017-7 (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recommendation%202017-7%20%28Regulatory%20Waivers%20 
nd%20Exemptions%29_0.pdf (“The authority to waive or exempt regulated parties from specific legal requirements 
affords agencies much-needed flexibility to respond to situations in which generally applicable laws are a poor fit for a 
given situation.”).  
101 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 447 (2017) (explaining how the 
FDA’s decision to exempt laboratory-developed tests from its medical device regime “demonstrates the rapid innovation—
but also the quality problems—that can result from such a policy.”). See also Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 579, 580 (2019) (expressing skepticism about the promotion of innovation as a regulatory goal, and 
arguing that the best reason to advance a regulatory sandbox is to cope with—rather than promote—financial innovation). 
102 Nielson, supra note 33, at 2. 
103 See generally Aman, Jr., supra note 32, at 303; ACUS, supra note 100, at 1. 
104  See generally EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY 
UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (warning of backlash by regulated firms when rules are applied unwaveringly by the book).  
105 Glicksman & Shapiro, Improving Regulation through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (2004) (citing 
WAIT Radio v. F.C.C., 418 F.2d 1153, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[A] rule is more likely to be undercut if it does not in some 
way take into account considerations of hardship, equity, or more effective implementation of overall policy, 
considerations that an agency cannot realistically ignore, at least on a continuing basis.”)). 
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good. On the contrary, if used unthinkingly or injudiciously, unrules can undermine the purpose of a 
regulation or advantage special interests over the broader public good. They can even introduce a 
source of arbitrariness in a system of regulation that is antithetical to the rule of law. We highlight 
below three major risks posed by unrules and offer prominent examples to illustrate each. 
 
1. Negating Regulatory Benefits 
 
 Although unrules can sometimes reduce regulatory costs, 106  in doing so, they also may 
diminish the benefits of regulations. 107  This prospect may be more likely than we realize, as 
policymakers rarely realize unrules’ full consequences at the time they are created.108 Indeed, such 
consequences may not materialize until years later, after regulated entities figure out how to 
restructure their activities to fall into a category that escapes a rule’s obligations. But human decision-
making tends to be myopic.109 When regulators are faced with a seemingly sympathetic case for a 
dispensation or for carving out a particular line of business from a rule, the short-term payoffs from 
such obligation alleviation will tend to loom larger than the long-term consequences. 
These psychological tendencies toward myopia can be exacerbated by a political economy that 
ensures that individuals or businesses petitioning for obligation alleviation will be better mobilized 
than those who lose from such alleviation.110 Political economy reasons help explain the common 
practice of grandfathering existing businesses out of regulatory obligations. Yet the long-term 
negative consequences of carving out exceptions for existing firms can be substantial. For example, 
the Clean Air Act’s pollution carveout for existing plants has encouraged owners to focus on 
extending their plants’ lives rather than building new plants that would be inherently cleaner.111 
One need not look far to find other instances where unrules have substantially undermined 
regulatory benefits. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has long carved out silica 
dust from its rules designed to control inhalation of harmful substances in coal mining, even though 
exposure to silica has been linked to progressive massive fibrosis among coal miners.112 Even when 
 
106 See, e.g., Richard Seig, Little-Known Hazardous Waste Exceptions Can Significantly Reduce Regulatory Burdens, CTR. FOR RETAIL 
COMPLIANCE (Jan. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/retailcrc/little-known-hazardous-waste-exceptions-can-significantly-
reduce-regulatory-burdens-8f047ad0c241. 
107 See, e.g., ACUS, supra note 100, at 2 (noting that waiving or exempting parties from compliance with regulations may 
impact the “protection of the public”); Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1222 (“Excessive reliance on back-end 
adjustments can water down a rule to the point that it is far less effective in protecting the public or the environment than 
it would be if implemented as designed and without adjustments.”). 
108 The invasion of zebra mussels in the Great Lakes is an example of negative effects unforeseen at the time EPA regulators 
carved out ballast water from the protections of the Clean Water Act. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
109 ROBERT MEYER & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, THE OSTRICH PARADOX: WHY WE UNDERPREPARE FOR DISASTERS 13-19 
(2017); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 137-140 (2011). 
110  JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 369 (1980) (“When the benefits of a prospective policy are 
concentrated but the costs widely distributed, client politics is likely to result. Some small, easily organized group will 
benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per capita 
rate over a large number of people, and hence they have little incentive to organize in opposition—if, indeed, they even 
hear of the policy.” (emphasis in original)). See also infra Part III.C.1. 
111 RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE WAR ON COAL 3-4 (2016). 
112 Howard Berkes, Huo Jingnan, & Robert Benincasa, An Epidemic is Killing Thousands of Coal Miners. Regulators Could 
Have Stopped It, NPR (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/18/675253856/an-epidemic-is-killing-thousands-
of-coal-miners-regulators-could-have-stopped-it; Kirsten S. Almberg et al., Progressive Massive Fibrosis Resurgence 
Identified in U.S. Coal Miners Filing for Black Lung Benefits, 1970-2016, 15 ANNALS OF THE AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 1420, 1424-
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MSHA under the Obama Administration tried to close broader “mine dust loopholes,” it still excluded 
silica dust from certain regulatory protections.113 Workers remain exposed to silica dust. 
Consider further that exemptions from rules governing blowout preventers on deepwater oil 
rigs appear to have contributed to the 2007 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico. One post-accident report noted that “it had become routine for [federal agency officials] to 
grant certain specific exemptions from regulatory requirements, mostly related to blowout preventer 
(BOP) testing, in order to accommodate the needs of deepwater operations.”114 Indeed, the day before 
the accident, the Minerals Management Service had approved exemptions from otherwise required 
protocols. Notwithstanding major legal and institutional reforms implemented after the oil spill to 
prevent a future catastrophe, a decade later the Trump Administration resumed the practice of issuing 
exemptions for deepwater drilling safety rules, reportedly issuing nearly 1,700 waivers from key 
requirements (including blowout preventer rules).115  
 
2. Regulatory Favoritism 
 
When regulatory agencies dole out dispensations or carve out firms from the scope of 
important rules, they might be acting at the behest of interest groups seeking undue favors at the 
expense of the general public.116 From a firm’s perspective, the ideal situation is to have a general rule 
put in place that obligates its competitors but allows itself a suspension of those requirements. We do 
know that industry lobbyists often try to persuade regulators to write rules that disadvantage their 
competitors while leaving their own firms subject to fewer or less stringent obligations.117 Carveouts 
and dispensations provide an excellent vehicle for ensuring favorable treatment. As we discuss more 
fully in Part III, unrules in general tend to receive less stringent oversight by the courts, and some 
dispensations escape altogether the open procedures and reporting requirements that apply to the 
rulemaking process.118 
Undue business influence appears to have played a key role, for example, in the issuance of 
dispensations to refineries during the first couple years of the Trump Administration. In 2018, the 
EPA granted a “financial hardship waiver” to a large oil refinery owned by the billionaire investor 
 
1425 (2018) (showing the consequences of worker exposure to silica dust). An estimated 100 workers die from silicosis 
every year. See Michael Sainato, ‘It’s Really Tragic’: Why Are Coalminers Still Dying from Black Lung Disease?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jan/24/us-coalminers-black-lung-disease-dying. 
113 For example, the old rules only required air sampling for only an eight-hour period—even if workers had longer than 
an eight-hour shift. In addition, companies could apparently conduct certain dust samples on days when production was 
at low levels (and thus dust levels were low too)—whereas the Respirable Dust Rule requires the samples “when mines 
are operating at 80 percent of production or more.” MSHA, Fact Sheet: MSHA’s Final Rule to Lower Miners’ Exposure to 
Respirable Coal Mine Dust, https://arlweb.msha.gov/endblacklung/docs/factsheet.pdf (last accessed Dec. 23, 2018). 
114 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Chief Counsel’s Report 253, 259 (2011), 
http://www.wellintegrity.net/documents/ccr_macondo_disaster.pdf. 
115 Ben Lefebvre, Exclusive: Interior Hands Out Hundreds of Offshore Drilling Safety Rule Waivers, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2019/02/25/exclusive-interior-hands-out-hundreds-of-offshore-
drilling-safety-rule-waivers-871540. 
116  See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel 
Carpenter & David Moss, eds. 2013); Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CLASSICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Steven Balla, Martin Lodge & Edward Page, eds., 2015). 
117 Recent empirical research indicates that businesses can influence the design of regulations. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & 
Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006). 
118 See infra Part III. 
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Carl Icahn, who had served as an early advisor to President Trump on regulatory matters.119 In that 
capacity, Icahn had reportedly tried—but failed—to see the EPA amend a Renewable Fuel Standard 
(RFS) requirement that his company, CVR Energy, purchase renewable fuel credits, which was 
costing the firm hundreds of millions of dollars.120 From Icahn’s perspective, getting a waiver from 
the RFS may have represented the next best thing: from August 2017, when he resigned from his 
special advisor position, to May 2018, shortly after news surfaced that CVR had received a hardship 
waiver, the firm’s stock price more than doubled, resulting in a reported $1.4 billion gain for Icahn.121 
Notably, the EPA took its action under a statutory provision giving it authority to grant waivers to 
“small refineries” that demonstrate that they would otherwise suffer “disproportionate economic 
hardship.”122 The EPA gave a dispensation to Icahn’s refinery and to those of other companies even 
though their size was anything but small.123  
Such undue business influence may have also been enabled by a different kind of dispensation: 
government ethics rule waivers.124 Erik Baptist, a lawyer working in the Trump Administration in 
the same EPA program office responsible for the renewable fuel standard, previously served as a 
lobbyist and lawyer for a trade association for the oil and gas industry. In that capacity, Baptist had 
lobbied Congress to repeal the renewable fuel standard. In 2017, before EPA had issued a waiver to 
Icahn, White House counsel Don McGahn reportedly gave Baptist an ethics waiver that allowed him 
to work on renewable fuel regulatory issues for the EPA.125 According to a 2018 news report, at least 
37 Trump Administration officials—including several former industry lobbyists—received official 
ethics waivers from the White House Counsel in the early years of the Administration, allowing those 
former lobbyists to work on issues that directly affected their previous employers in the private 
sector.126 
Undue business influence over dispensations has not been limited to the EPA. When defense 
contractor Raytheon saw sales of its missile systems to Saudi Arabia stymied by congressional 
opposition, it found a lobbyist with close ties to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.127 That lobbyist was 
able to arrange a meeting between Raytheon officials and Secretary Pompeo—and, a few months later, 
the State Department took the highly unusual step of invoking a waiver provision in the Arms Export 
Control Act that allowed the Raytheon missile sale to proceed without the normal lag period that 
 
119 Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Exclusive: U.S. EPA Grants Biofuels Waiver to Billionaire Icahn’s Oil Refinery – Sources, 
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-epa-icahn/exclusive-u-s-epa-grants-
biofuels-waiver-to-billionaire-icahns-oil-refinery-sources-idUSKBN1I10YB.  
120  See Patrick Radden Keefe, Carl Icahn’s Failed Raid on Washington, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/carl-icahns-failed-raid-on-washington. 
121 Tom Di Christopher, Carl Icahn’s Refinery Investment Has Rebounded by $1.4 billion, Boosted by Trump Energy Policy, CNBC (May 
4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/04/carl-icahns-cvr-energy-investment-rebounds-by-more-than-1-billion.html. 
122 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(o)(9).  
123 See Di Christopher, supra note 121 (noting that CVR Refining posted nearly $147 million in profit in the first quarter of 2018). 
124 See, e.g., Laura Peterson, Ryan Zinke’s Interior Department Gives Law-Breaking Coal Company a Pass, THE DAILY BEAST 
(June 25, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ryan-zinkes-interior-department-gives-law-breaking-coal-company-a-
pass (chronicling insider meetings that led to the Department of Interior granting an enforcement dispensation to a 
mining company charged with regulatory violations). 
125 Michael Biesecker, Juliet Linderman & Richard Lardner, What Swamp? Lobbyists Get Ethics Waivers to Work for Trump, 
AP NEWS (March 8, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/2e23b380a1ec4232abde917d8796d7a6. 
126 Id. 
127 Kenneth P. Vogel, Michael LaForgia, & Hailey Fuchs, Trump Vowed to ‘Drain the Swamp,’ But Lobbyists Are Helping Run 
His Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/us/politics/trump-lobbyists-swamp-
campaign.html. 
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would have allowed Congress to block the sale.128 The waiver was granted under the authority of a 
provision in the Act that authorizes departures from normal procedures when “an emergency exists 
which requires [an arms] sale in the national security interest of the United States”129—but, of course, 
nothing evincing any real emergency had ever been shown. 
These are but a few examples illustrating the basic incentives behind the politics of unrules.  
Just as regulatory capture can arise when highly motivated, powerful businesses pressure government 
decision-makers to adopt rules that create barriers of entry to competitors, businesses also have 
incentives to seek to use unrules to get out from under regulations and avoid the compliance costs 
that other firms must bear. This is a kind of unregulatory capture. 
 
3. The Unrule of Law 
 
When unrules “swallow the rule,”130 they can completely subvert the laws on the books.131 In 
addition, if carveouts are indiscriminate and dispensations frequent and undisclosed, the law may no 
longer come to provide the predictability, notice, and fairness that it needs to operate effectively. 
When abused, unrules can turn regulation into little more than politics by other means.132 In some 
cases, unrules might even become a tool of “administrative sabotage” for opponents of regulatory 
programs.133 
 
128 Michael R. Pompeo, Emergency Notification of Arms Sales to Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia 
(May 24, 2019), https://www.state.gov/emergency-notification-of-arms-sales-to-jordan-the-united-arab-emirates-and-
saudi-arabia/. 
129 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b). See Edward Wong, Catie Edmondson, & Eric Schmitt, Trump Officials Prepare to Bypass Congress to 
Sell Weapons to Gulf-Nations, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/trump-
saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html. 
130 See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Donald J. Trump, No. 17-4540 577 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (characterizing the 
Trump Administration’s proposed exemptions from the ACA’s contraceptive coverage mandate as “the proverbial 
exception that swallows the rule”). See also Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929, 958 
(2018) (“In crafting religious accommodations, legislatures and courts take as a fundamental premise that accommodation 
does not defeat the purpose of the law.”). 
131  FULLER, supra note 68, at 39. Others have recognized this risk with regulatory exemptions—or what we call 
dispensations. Aman, Jr., supra note 32, at 292 (“[I]f exceptions to rules are freely and easily granted, with little or no 
regard for principle, the ‘inner morality of law’ may be jeopardized. … [A]n arbitrary exceptions regime would be 
characterized not by too much law, but by no law at all.”); Sean D. Croston, An Important Member of the Family: The Role of 
Regulatory Exemptions in Administrative Procedure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 291, 309 (2012) (“[I]f a child is allowed to stay up late 
past bedtime on most nights, it is not a special permission anymore--it is a new bedtime. … [T]he “parent” agency should 
announce the new bedtime as a new rule rather than simply granting permission each night.”); Glicksman & Shapiro, 
supra note 105, at 1222 (“[O]nce the exceptions swallow a rule, regulatory policy becomes incoherent” and “regulated 
entities [will be encouraged not] to comply with the original rule … if they think there is a good chance that they can 
obtain a favorable adjustment of some sort.”). For a helpful discussion of rule-of-law issues related to dispensations, see 
generally Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority: Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments over 
Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 235, 250–57, 262-65 (2016). 
132 Even those who are otherwise no great fans of regulation recognize the threat that unrules can pose to the rule of law 
if regulators have too much discretion over how to use them. See Richard Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 NAT. AFF. 39, 
39-41 (2011). Under some circumstances, the prospect of unrules may even increase regulatory burdens. Aaron Nielson 
has written about how waivers can be dangled in front of private parties and used to extract concessions that regulators 
may not have had the authority to compel. Aaron Nielson, Nonenforcement and the Dangers of Leveraging, LOYOLA U. CHI. 
J. REG. COMP. 19 (2018). 
133 See David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage (Jul. 29, 2020) (on file with authors). 
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During the Trump Administration, the potential threats to the rule of law posed by unrules 
grew particularly salient. For example, shortly after taking office, President Trump signed Executive 
Order 13765, which directed relevant agencies to “waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the 
implementation of any provision or requirement” contained in the Affordable Care Act.134 President 
Trump’s order urged administrators to use unrules in an effort to undermine a statute that the 
President wanted to repeal in Congress but could not. One result of his executive order was the 
widening of a carveout in the ACA that allows short-term health insurance plans to escape the 
prohibitions on excluding people with pre-existing conditions or charging people higher premiums 
based on their health status.135 By redefining short-term health plans to allow more plans to qualify 
for exemption from otherwise applicable prohibitions, the Administration’s actions can be expected 
to lead healthier individuals to opt for the cheaper short-term plans and leave sicker patients stuck in 
the fully compliant insurance market, thus driving up premiums in contravention of the statute’s 
purpose.136 City officials across the United States have charged that “[t]he Trump Administration’s 
actions are … an affront to the rule of law.”137 Law professors Nicholas Bagley and Abbe Gluck 
accused the President of “an unconstitutional usurpation of power,” arguing that “[n]ever in modern 
American history has a president so transparently aimed to destroy a piece of major legislation.”138 
Efforts to alleviate obligations imposed on government officials pose their own risks to the 
rule of law. One of the most controversial unrules of President Trump’s first two years in office came 
in the aftermath of the longest government shutdown in U.S. history: the President invoked the 
National Emergencies Act to justify the redirection of military appropriations to fund the 
construction of a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico.139 Under the National Emergencies Act, a 
presidential emergency declaration triggers up to 136 “special or extraordinary” statutory unrules,140 
including one that allows the government to “undertake military construction projects . . . not 
otherwise authorized by law.”141 Because of the number and breadth of dispensations triggered by the  
  
 
134 Exec Order No. 13,765 (2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8,351 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
135 26 C.F.R § 2590 (2018). 
136 Katie Keith, Administration Moves to Liberalize Rules on Short-Term, Non-ACA-Compliant Coverage, HEALTH AFF. BLOG 
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180220.69087/full/; Paul Spitalnic, Estimated 
Financial Effects of the Short-Term, Limited-Duration Policy Proposed Rule, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES 
OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/Actua 
rialStudies/Downloads/STLD20180406.pdf. 
137 City of Columbus et al. v. Donald J. Trump, Case No. 18-cv-2364, *3 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2018). 
138  Nicholas Bagley and Abbe R. Gluck, Trump’s Sabotage of Obamacare is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/opinion/trump-obamacare-illegal.html. 
139 Proclamation 9844, Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 4,949 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/20/2019-03011/declaring-a-national-
emergency-concerning-the-southern-border-of-the-united-states. 
140  50 U.S.C. § 1621; see also Brennan Center for Justice, A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/emergency-powers (identifying 136 statutory powers that “may become available to 
the president upon declaration of a national emergency”); Elizabeth Gotein, What the President Could Do If He Declares a State of 
Emergency, THE ATLANTIC (Jan/Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-
emergency-powers/576418/. In July 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the Trump Administration’s request for a stay of a 
district court’s permanent injunction against the government’s action to redirect funds under the President’s emergency 
declaration, allowing construction of the border wall to move forward pending appeal. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 588 U.S. __ 
(2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/19a60_o75p.pdf. 
141  10 U.S.C. § 2808. These are unrules directed at the goverment: they waive certain obligations with which the 
government would otherwise have had to comply. 
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President’s emergency declaration, and because he used this provision to get around a congressional 
rejection of a border wall, a number of leading legal scholars have argued that President Trump’s 
action amounted to an unlawful abuse of presidential power.142 One conservative commentator called 
President Trump’s emergency declaration simply “contemptuous of the rule of law.”143 
 
* * * 
  
In sum, although the responsible use of unrules can play a positive—even necessary—role in 
regulatory law, the misuse of unrules can also undermine the rule of law, create incentives for undue 
interest group influence, and reduce the benefits that regulations have been created to produce. These 
concerns might be easy to overlook if unrules were only an exceptional or infrequent part of a 
regulatory system, or if administrative discretion to use unrules were sufficiently constrained by 
adequate procedures and oversight. But, as we show in the next Part of this Article, unrules are 
ubiquitous. This ubiquity of unrules, combined with the distinctive risks they pose, make all the more 
troubling what we show in Part III—that current law tends to leave agencies’ power to alleviate 
obligations less constrained than their power to impose them. 
 
II. THE UBIQUITY OF UNRULES 
 
Once we become alert to them, important unrules can be found lurking behind nearly every 
important issue affecting law and society today as well as in the mundane details of everyday life: the 
Trump Administration’s so-called Muslim travel ban;144 the viral spread of political propaganda on 
social media;145 access to insurance coverage for contraceptive care;146 investments of retirement 
 
142  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, No, Trump Cannot Declare an ‘Emergency’ to Build His Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2019),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/no-trump-cannot-declare-an-emergency-to-build-his-wall.html; but 
see Samuel Estreicher & David Moosmann, Trump’s Emergency Wall Declaration: A Guide to the Legal Issues, VERDICT (Mar. 
4, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/03/04/president-trumps-emergency-wall-declaration-a-guide-to-the-legal-
issues (arguing that “the president appears, at a minimum, to have a credible statutory argument both on the authorization 
of the construction projects and on some of the identified sources of funding”). 
143  David French, Trump’s Emergency Declaration Is Contemptuous of the Rule of Law, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/trump-emergency-declaration-contemptuous-of-rule-of-law/; see also Charlie 
Savage, Trump’s Face-Saving Way Out of Crisis Raises Fears Over Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/us/politics/trump-national-emergency-law.html. 
144 The Supreme Court relied in part on the existence of “case-by-case waivers when a foreign national demonstrates 
undue hardship” in upholding the Trump Administration’s travel ban. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018). 
145  In 2006, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) created carveouts in the definitions of “contribution” and 
“expenditure” that eliminated campaign finance regulation of Internet political activity. Internet Communications, 71 
Fed. Reg. 18,589 (Apr. 12, 2006). 
146 The Trump Administration has issued rules dramatically expanding moral and religious exemptions from the ACA’s 
requirement to cover contraceptive care. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (religious exemptions); 83 Fed. Reg. 
57,592 (moral exemptions). In January 2020, the Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to hear challenges 
to lower courts’ decisions to issue and uphold a national injunction against enforcing the exemptions. See Lawrence 
Hurley, Supreme Court to Hear Trump Appeal in Obamacare Contraception Fight, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-contraception/supreme-court-to-hear-trump-appeal-in-obamacare-
contraception-fight-idUSKBN1ZG2EC. 
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savings in securities markets;147 and even visits to the Grand Canyon148—to offer just a few examples 
beyond those we have already mentioned. 
That it becomes easy to identify examples of unrules itself testifies to their ubiquity. But to 
see more systematically the extent to which unrules prevail in regulatory law, in this Part we report 
the results of the first empirical research measuring indicia of unrules in federal regulatory law. 
Employing widely accepted quantitative methods to analyze the text of several major legal sources, 
we find evidence that unrules are virtually omnipresent in regulatory law, even growing apace with 
indicia of rules in recent years. The significance of these findings is difficult to overstate. 
As we will discuss further in Part III, our findings indicate that the U.S. regulatory system has 
much more play in the joints than has been previously understood. Both public discourse on, and 
academic analysis of, regulation tends to treat the imposition of obligations as the defining feature of 
the administrative state. It is easy to get the impression of regulatory law as burdensome and inflexible 
when one only focuses on the obligations the law imposes. We are able to demonstrate systematically 
that, in reality, the regulatory system in the United States has a tremendous amount of “wiggle room” 
too. If scholars and practitioners are to understand the regulatory system in its entirety, we must 
appreciate how much it is a system of both rules and unrules. 
To be sure, language indicative of unrules—that is, obligation-alleviating words such as may, 
waive, and exempt—are still outnumbered in sources of regulatory law by words indicative of the 
imposition of obligations, such as shall, must, and prohibit. But, as we explain further below, the evidence 
we find for the existence of unrules almost certainly represents a lower bound on the total obligation 
alleviation in regulatory law and practice. The language we identify for potential unrules can be invoked 
either repeatedly to alleviate many obligations or all at once to alleviate broad swaths of obligations with 
a single stroke. Furthermore, our measures also do not capture the myriad informal ways that 
administrative agencies use their enforcement discretion to provide relief from regulatory obligations. 
Taken together, the evidence from our computer-assisted quantitative methods and the many 
examples we have assembled show not only that unrules are ubiquitous but, by extension, so too is 
the considerable authority agencies possess to alleviate obligations. Given the risks that obligation 
alleviation can pose in terms of negating regulatory benefits, fostering favoritism, and undercutting 
the rule of law, the power to alleviate obligations deserves much the same kind of transparency and 
oversight that attend agencies’ exercise of their power to impose obligations. Yet as we explain in Part 
III, core features of administrative law have tended to give obligation alleviation more of a pass than 
is prudent, given the ubiquity of unrules demonstrated here.  
 
A. Uncovering Unrules: Methods 
 
For decades, when lawyers, politicians, and scholars have expressed consternation over 
federal regulatory burdens, they have typically pointed to the number of pages in the Federal Regi- 
 
147 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes New Approval Process for Certain Exchange-Traded Funds, (Jun. 28, 2018), https://www. 
sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-118 (acknowledging that ETFs are “hybrid investment products not originally provided for by 
the U.S. securities laws” but proposing a carveout so that that “ETFs that satisfy certain conditions would be able to operate within 
the scope of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and to come to market without applying for individual exemptive orders”). 
148 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has granted the Hualapai tribe a hardship exemption from the cap on the 
number of helicopter flights they can run through the Grand Canyon, leading to concerns about excessive exhaust and 
noise pollution. Nick Paumgarten, The Grand Canyon Needs to be Saved by Every Generation, NEW YORKER (Sept. 26, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-grand-canyon-needs-to-be-saved-by-every-generation. 
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ster.149 In 1946, when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, a total of 14,736 pages 
appeared in the Federal Register.150 By 2016, the annual number of pages had grown to 97,069—an 
increase of 650 percent over seventy years.151 But despite the occasional claim that “the number of 
pages in the Federal Register is a reasonably good proxy for overall regulatory output,”152 page counts 
cannot indicate anything about the content of pages or their substantive impacts, especially the extent 
to which they impose obligations or alleviate them. 153  For this reason, we dissect sources of 
regulatory law at the level of the words that actually appear on the page. 
Specifically, our main empirical methodology in this Part follows an approach employed in 
recent years by other researchers who analyze linguistic patterns in large bodies of legal text.154 
Researchers at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, for example, have used similar 
techniques to estimate what they call “regulatory restrictions”—or, more precisely, obligations—by 
counting key words in regulatory texts. 155  The Mercatus Center researchers have developed a 
quantitative dataset they call RegData, which essentially contains the results of computerized word 
searches that quantify the number of obligation-related terms used in regulations: shall, must, may not, 
prohibited, and required.156 They have used their results showing a nearly 20 percent increase in obliga- 
 
149 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 25, at 767 (“Measured by any and every index, our law is exploding. New statutes, regulations, and 
ordinances are increasing at geometric rates at all levels of government.”); HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND 
ABUSES 5 (1977) (“Today, you can hardly turn around without bumping into some federal restraint or requirement.”); Michael 
Mandel & Diana G. Carew, Regulatory Improvement Commission: A Politically Viable Approach to U.S. Regulatory Reform, PROGRESSIVE 
POLICY INSTITUTE, at 3 (May 2013), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/05.2013-Mandel-
Carew_Regulatory-Improvement-Commission_A-Politically-Viable-Approach-to-US-Regulatory-Reform.pdf (“New regulations 
are constantly being added from just about every federal agency. . . . New regulations simply accumulate on top of old ones.”); 
Susan E. Dudley, Can Fiscal Budget Concepts Improve Regulation?, 19 LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 264-65 (2016) (“Despite central 
oversight and requirements for public input and BCA, the growth in new regulations continues . . ., and with it concerns that 
we have reached a point of diminishing returns.”). 
150 Federal Register Pages Published, 1936-2018, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads 
/2019/10/pagesPublished2018-1.pdf (last accessed Feb. 12, 2020). 
151 Id. The annual number of pages has dropped since 2016. 
152 Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 290 (2013). 
153 See Jodi L. Short, The Trouble with Counting: Cutting Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting, 103 MINN. L. REV. 93, 97 (2018) (“[T]here 
are no good reasons to believe that counting the number of regulations is a useful proxy for the costs or burdens of regulation.”). 
154 Methods of quantitative text analysis have emerged as a central analytical tool in the social sciences. See Justin Grimmer 
& Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 10 
POL. ANAL. 1 (2013); Kenneth Benoit, Michael Laver, & Slava Mikhaylov, Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty 
in Text Statements of Policy Positions, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 495 (2009). For examples of legal scholarship employing these 
methods, see MICHAEL LIVERMORE & DANIEL ROCKMORE, LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF 
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2019); Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effect on Rulewriting, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 85 (2019); Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation: Delegation, Public Policy, and Democracy, 106 CAL. L. 
REV. 1529 (2018); David S. Law, Constitutional Archetypes, 95 TEX. L. REV. 153 (2016); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. 
Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).  
155 See Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, RegData, supra note 28; Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin, & Pietro Peretto, The 
Cumulative Cost of Regulations, MERCATUS WORKING PAPER (Apr. 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Coffey-
Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf.  We will use the more clinical word “obligations” because that is what these words impose. 
Whether they in fact restrict anyone’s behavior will be contingent on what obligates separately wish to do. A person may 
well have a legal obligation to shovel the walkway in front of her house in the winter, but if she would already shovel it 
anyway for her own convenience or just because she wishes to be neighborly, she will not be in any way restricted. 
156 RegData: A QuantGov Product, https://quantgov.org/regdata/ (last accessed June 19, 2018). In the latest release, Reg 
Data 3.1, the authors measure the number of occurrences of each of these words and phrases in each Part of the Code of 
Federal Regulations from 1970 to 2017. In addition, the authors use machine-learning text classification algorithms to 
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tion-related words since 1997 to caution against adding further regulation, claiming that “regulatory 
accumulation will continue to stifle economic growth.”157 
But the Mercatus Center research does not take account of unrules. We have thus both 
replicated the methods underlying RegData and also adapted and expanded them to the task of 
measuring unrules, based on a dictionary of five comparable obligation-alleviating terms: waive, 
exclude, except, exempt, and variance.158 We used computerized computational techniques to search for 
both obligation-imposing and obligation-alleviating terms throughout the Federal Register and the 
Code of Federal Regulations, as well as in the U.S. Code. In our searches, we used both cognate and 
inflected forms of the ten dictionary search terms. For instance, for the word waive, we searched for 
waive(s), waiving, waived, and waiver(s). We did the same for all of the obligation-alleviating and 
obligation-imposing words and phrases in our dictionaries. 159  We also separately conducted 
validation testing based on a random sample of our dictionary words in context, in which two legally 
trained coders confirmed that the words were actually being used in a manner consistent with 
expectations—namely, to impose or alleviate legal obligations.160  
Table 2 provides examples of regulatory provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations that 
feature one or more of the obligation-alleviating terms used in our analysis. These examples show 
how the terms in our unrule dictionary are commonly used to limit, lessen, or eliminate regulatory 
obligations, either by carving out specified activities or actors from the scope of a general rule or by 
authorizing or establishing procedures for regulated entities to obtain dispensations. With our 
dictionary of unrule-related terms thus defined, we then used a package in the statistical software “R” 
 
 
 
predict which industry is primarily affected by each obligation-imposing term. Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, RegData, supra 
note 28, at 115-17 (describing methodology used to generate “industry relevance” measures). 
157  Patrick A. McLaughlin, Nita Ghei, and Michael Wilt, Regulatory Accumulation and Its Costs: An Overview,  
MERCATUS (Nov. 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mclaughlin2c_ghei2c_and_wilt_-_policy_brief_-
_regulatory_accumulation_ep_update_-_v1_1.pdf.  
158 These were, of course, not the only words that might be used to alleviate regulatory obligations—just as the five words 
in the Mercatus Center dictionary are not the only ones that could be used to impose obligations. Indeed, we brainstormed 
19 possible obligation-alleviating terms before settling on the five terms we used. We wanted a dictionary of equivalent 
size and comparable character to the RegData dictionary, and settled on the five we did because they seemed the most 
intuitively related to the lifting of obligations. Other words and phrases we considered were grandfather, not apply, not 
include, applies only to, limited to, shall not apply, except small business, need not comply, forbearance, only if, permission, suspend, 
permit, and allow. Our choices about which words to use in the unrules dictionary were not based on the frequency with 
which they appear in regulatory texts. Indeed, we were surprised that one word in our unrule dictionary—variance—is 
relatively infrequently used in federal regulatory texts. Rather, we aimed for words we thought would be cleaner and 
more precise in their meaning. For example, we did not use permit because even though its verb form could connote 
obligation alleviation, its noun form seemed more associated with the imposition of obligations. See infra note 160 for a 
description of our efforts to validate empirically that the words chosen capture the distinction between obligation 
alleviation and obligation imposition. 
159 Table 2 shows the cognate and inflected forms for the words in our unrules dictionary. Our obligation-imposing 
dictionary included a similar set of variants. 
160 We randomly sampled 75 examples of obligation-imposing words and 75 examples of obligation-alleviating words 
from the Code of Federal Regulations, then captured 500 words before and after each sampled word. The coders found 
that 95 percent of the words used in context matched the expected meaning. When asked about the clarity of meaning, 
the coders agreed that 115 out of the 150 words were either “clear” or “very clear” from the context. Of these 115 instances, 
the coders agreed on the regulatory effect of the words in 112 of the instances, which in those instances lined up exactly 
as expected. In short, we were able to validate that the words contained in our dictionary do meaningfully capture 
obligation imposition and alleviation.     
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TABLE 2: EXAMPLES OF REGULATORY PROVISIONSFEATURING OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS 
 
 
Obligation-Alleviating Term Examples 
waive, waiver, waivers, waiving, 
waives, waived 
 
• By application pursuant to § 1787.10, the Administrator may waive the Buy 
American requirement upon a showing that application of the requirement would 
be inconsistent with the public interest or impractical for the RUS Borrower. (7 
C.F.R. § 1787.13) 
• You may request that we waive any specific requirement of this part. You may submit 
your request, with supporting documentation, separately or as a part of your postmarket 
surveillance submission to the address in § 822.8. (21 C.F.R. § 822.29) 
• The Administrator may waive the provisions of this subpart for a manufacturer 
or a specific engine family, as specified in paragraphs (b)(1), (2) and (3) of this 
section. (40 C.F.R. § 91.501) 
 
exempt, exempts, exempting, 
exempted, exemption, exemptions 
• Crude oil tankers engaged in coastwise trade are exempt from the requirements 
of §§ 151.2025 (ballast water management (BWM) requirements), 151.2060 
(reporting), and 151.2070 (recordkeeping) of this subpart. (33 C.F.R. § 151.2015) 
• A vessel that is required to operate and maintain the mobile transceiver unit 
continuously 24 hours a day throughout the fishing year may be exempted from this 
requirement if a valid exemption report … is received by NMFS OLE and the vessel 
is in compliance with all conditions and requirements of the VMS exemption identified 
in this section and specified in the exemption report. (50 C.F.R. § 660.14) 
  
except, excepted, excepting, 
excepts, exception, exceptions 
• After the application of any pesticide on an agricultural establishment, the 
agricultural employer shall not allow or direct any worker to enter or to remain in 
the treated area before the restricted-entry interval specified on the pesticide 
labeling has expired, except as provided in this section. (40 C.F.R. § 170.112) 
• A regulated entity to which a final suspension order in effect is applicable may 
request an exception from such order to allow it to engage in a particular covered 
transaction with a suspended person and any affiliates thereof. (12 C.F.R. § 1227.10) 
• Streambeds, banks, and flood plains will not be disturbed, except as may be 
necessary to construct, operate, and maintain irrigation, fisheries, utilities, roads, 
and similar facilities or improvements. (36 C.F.R. § 292.16) 
  
exclude, excluding, excluded, 
exclusion, excludes, exclusions 
• Manufacturers and owners of locomotives that operate only on non-standard 
gauge rails may ask us to exclude such locomotives from this part by excluding 
them from the definition of “locomotive”. (40 C.F.R. § 1033.5) 
• Pool plant means a plant, unit of plants, or a system of plants as specified in 
paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section, but excluding a plant specified in 
paragraph (h) of this section.  
• Actions listed below when considered individually and cumulatively do not have 
significant effects on the quality of the human environment and are categorically 
excluded from NEPA documentation. (33 C.F.R. § 230.9) 
  
variance, variances 
• A supplier of water may request the granting of a variance pursuant to this 
subpart for a public water system within a State that does not have primary 
enforcement responsibility by submitting a request for a variance in writing to the 
Administrator. (40 C.F.R. § 142.41) 
• The PBGC shall approve a request for a variance or exemption if PBGC 
determines that approval of the request is warranted, in that it—(1) Would more 
effectively or equitably carry out the purposes of title IV of ERISA; and (2) Would 
not significantly increase the risk of financial loss to the plan. (29 C.F.R. § 4204.22) 
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called quanteda161 to compute summary statistics about the frequency of each term in our dictionary 
in a variety of sources of regulatory text: the Federal Register, the Code of Federal Regulations, and 
the U.S. Code.  
 
B. Unrules in the Federal Register 
 
We begin with the Federal Register because it has been the source most widely cited to support 
conventional wisdom about the growth of obligation imposition in the United States. Agencies are 
required to publish each new regulation in the Register before it can go into effect.162 Yet unrules can 
also be embedded in these agency regulations. For instance, in a document labeled as a “final rule,” the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in 2015 established “public company waivers” that 
would “exempt about 94 percent of plans and sponsors from many reporting requirements and result 
in a net reduction in reporting to PBGC,” all in an explicit effort to “reduce unnecessary reporting 
requirements, while at the same time better targeting PBGC’s resources to plans that pose the greatest 
risks to the pension insurance system.”163 
Figure 1a presents annual counts for our five obligation-alleviating terms in the Federal 
Register from 1936 to 2016. The number has been trending upward since 1990 (after a steep decline 
in the 1980s) and has seen sharper upticks since 2010. To put these alleviating terms into some further 
context, we can look at the most recent year in the data, 2016, where there were 146,894 occurrences 
of alleviating terms. By comparison, in that same year there were 746,742 occurrences of obligation-
imposing terms. Clearly, impositional terms do outnumber alleviating terms in the Federal Register. 
But the ratio of 1 obligation-alleviating term to every 5.1 obligation-imposing terms suggests that 
unrule-related terms are a substantial, if not integral, part of the corpus of regulation. Indeed, as 
Figure 1b shows, the ratio of alleviating to imposing terms has been increasing over time, at times 
spiking to 1 alleviating term per 3.5 imposing terms. 
To compare obligation imposition and alleviation further using the Federal Register, we used 
Lexis Advance’s comprehensive Federal Register library to search just in the “action” field within each 
document—a field which agencies use to designate the kind of action they are taking. For the period 
1979-2016, we conducted a simple search looking for documents with one of two obligation-
alleviating words—waiver or exemption—in this field.164 Much as agencies use the labels “proposed 
rule” and “final rule” in the action field in Lexis when promulgating regulations, they also sometimes 
publish notices of waivers and exemptions with corresponding labels when issuing dispensations. For 
instance, the Employee Benefits Security Administration in the Department of Labor entered “Grant 
of individual exemptions” in the action field of a Federal Register document which granted a Deutsche 
Bank subsidiary a dispensation from certain obligations under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).165 Even though relatively few agencies are required to publish notices 
 
 
 
161 Quanteda 1.3.0, https://docs.quanteda.io/ (last accessed June 19, 2018).  
162  5 U.S.C. § 553. See generally Maeve P. Carey, Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal 
Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register, CONG. RES. SERV., at 14 (Oct. 4, 2016),  https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2147&context=key_workplace. 
163 Reportable Events and Certain Other Notification Requirements; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,980 (Sept. 11, 2015). 
164 Specifically, our search term was action (exempt! or waiv!) and date = year. We also searched for final rule and proposed 
rule documents in order to assess the relative balance of these different types of actions. 
165 Exemptions from Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,028 (Dec. 22, 2016). 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 28 
 
FIGURE 1A: OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER, 1936-2016 
 
 
FIGURE 1B: RATIO OF OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS TO OBLIGATION-IMPOSING 
TERMS IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER, 1936-2017 
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of dispensations in the Federal Register,166 we found an average of 576 waivers or exemptions per year 
designated as such in the action field of the Federal Register. Comparing these notices of unrules to 
notices of final rules, we found 1 reported dispensation for every 9 published rules—keeping in mind, 
as the PBGC example above indicates, that what an agency issues as a final rule can also contain 
unrules. 
 To gain additional perspective on the extent to which final rule documents in the Federal 
Register create or authorize unrules, we also examined the document titles that agencies gave to their 
entries in the Federal Register. As with the PBGC example, some documents designated as “final rule” 
in the action field nevertheless principally created exemptions or established procedures for agencies 
to grant dispensations. A 2018 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) document designated as a 
“final rule” was entitled “Updates to Rulemaking and Waiver Procedures and Expansion of the 
Equivalent Level of Safety Option.”167 This “rule” gave commercial space carriers the opportunity to 
request waivers if they showed they could meet equivalent levels of safety as provided by the rules.168 
As a rough gauge of the extent of final rule documents like these examples from the PBGC and FAA 
that have at least as much to do with obligation alleviation as with obligation imposition, we used 
another source of Federal Register data to search the titles of each final rule from 1996 to 2017.169 
Strikingly, given the common perception that agencies’ final rules primarily or even exclusively 
impose obligations, the term exempt made up a slightly higher proportion of all words in final rule 
titles during that period than did require.170 Indeed, obligation-alleviating terms were somewhat more 
frequent overall than obligation-imposing terms in the titles of agencies’ rule documents.171 
By now, it should be clear that the Federal Register contains more than just regulatory 
obligations. Of course, as others have pointed out in the past, the Federal Register contains a variety 
of non-binding notices and other materials too.172 Even final rule documents themselves contain 
lengthy preambles that are not technically binding law.173 But to date, no one has uncovered the 
hidden world of unrules within the pages of the Federal Register. We have found significant indicia of 
unrules, quantifying how ubiquitous they are. Even documents expressly labeled by agencies as “final 
rules” are sometimes really just about unrules. 
 
C. Unrules in the Code of Federal Regulations 
 
If we turn to the source of regulatory law that comprises solely binding text—the Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR)—we still find evidence of the ubiquity of unrules. The Government 
 
166 See infra tbl. 3. 
167 83 Fed. Reg. 28,528 (June 20, 2018). 
168 Id. 
169 Lexis Advance does not permit searching by title, so we used the Mercatus Center’s QuantGov data. See Quantgov, 
https://quantgov.org/data/ (last accessed June 20, 2018). 
170 Exempt constituted 0.86% of all words in final rule titles during that time period, while require constituted 0.81%.  
171 Overall, the titles for final rule documents in the Federal Register from 1996 to 2017 contained 13,312 obligation-
alleviating words and 12,703 obligation-imposing words. 
172  Carey, supra note 162, at 15-16 (explaining why page counts in the Federal Register are likely “only a rough 
approximation of regulatory activity each year”).  
173 For instance, the Clinton-era ergonomics rule was 608 pages long when printed in the Federal Register, but only eight 
of these pages contained actual rule text. See CINDY SKRZYCKI, THE REGULATORS: ANONYMOUS POWER BROKERS IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 28 (2003). 
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Publishing Office (GPO) makes the entire CFR available in plain text format, allowing us to  perform 
the same term frequency analysis on the CFR from 2005-2017 as we did on the Federal Register text.174 
In the latest year available, 2017, the CFR contained 241,225 individual occurrences of 
obligation-alleviating terms. As one might expect, the CFR contained many more individual 
occurrences of obligation-imposing terms: 1,429,897.175 But this still equated to a ratio of 1 alleviating 
word for every 5.9 impositional ones—only a slightly higher rate of impositional verbiage than what 
we found in the Federal Register. By far the most prominent word indicative of obligation alleviation 
was except, with 119,618 occurrences in the 2017 CFR. To put that number in perspective, except 
appeared about 3.5 times more frequently than two of the five obligation-imposing terms: prohibit 
(34,417) and may not (31,544) in that same year. To be sure, the other obligation-alleviating terms 
were less common. In 2017, the term exempt appeared 56,119 times; the word exclude appeared 33,015 
times; the term waive appeared 29,617 times; and the term variance occurred only 2,856 times. Yet 
obligation-alleviating terms as a group are far from negligible. 
Because the CFR text is available on an annual basis from 2005 to 2017, we were also able to 
trace the overall trend in the growth of unrules in the CFR. As Figure 2a shows, the use of obligation- 
  
FIGURE 2A: OCCURRENCES OF OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS IN THE CODE OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 2005-2017 
 
 
 
174  Code of Federal Regulations (Annual Edition) – Bulk Data, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFFICE, https://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/bulkdata/CFR (last accessed June 19, 2018). These data are in principle available from 1996 to present, although 
we discovered irregularities in how data were entered in the earlier years that led us to limit our analysis to the years that 
we report above. 
175  Note that our counts of obligation-imposing terms are slightly higher than those reported by Al-Ubaydli & 
McLaughlin, RegData, supra note 28.  This is because we included cognate and inflected forms of RegData’s base obligation-
imposing dictionary in order to match our approach to obligation-alleviating terms. 
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FIGURE 2B: RATIO OF OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS TO OBLIGATION-IMPOSING 
TERMS IN THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 2005-2017 
 
 
 
alleviating terms appears to be on an upwards trajectory, with the total volume of alleviating terms 
growing by approximately 17 percent since 2005.176 And Figure 2b, which shows how the ratio 
between alleviating and imposing terms has changed over the period of observation, suggests that 
there is a stable balance between rules and unrules—neither has grown at a significantly higher rate 
than the other over this time period.177 
 Each title of the CFR contains regulatory text organized by topical areas: for example, Title 
40 contains regulations governing environmental protection, and Title 47 contains regulations 
governing telecommunications. Figure 3 shows how the overall ratio of obligation-alleviating terms 
to obligation-imposing terms varies across CFR titles. In this figure, a longer bar means that the title 
contains more alleviating words relative to impositional words; the shorter bars reveal areas of federal 
regulation which are relatively impositional. The title for Labor falls roughly at average for the overall 
CFR, so titles higher than Labor in Figure 3 are above average in their ratio of alleviating to imposing 
in unrule language, with about 1 obligation-alleviating word for every 3 obligation-imposing words—
a finding at odds with common perceptions of tax regulations as exceedingly burdensome (although 
perhaps more consistent with perceptions that they are complex). By contrast, some topical areas that 
terms. There are some surprises here. Tax regulations, for example, are the part of the CFR most rich  
 
 
176 By comparison, Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin estimate that obligation-imposing terms increased 20.4 percent over that 
same period. See id. at 112. In our analysis, the growth rate across the two dictionaries (obligation-alleviating and 
obligation-imposing) is statistically indistinguishable, with obligation-imposing terms growing by 21 percent since 2005.   
177 The ratio of alleviating-to-imposing terms remains between 1:5.8 and 1:6 for the 13-year period. 
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FIGURE 3: RATIO OF OBLIGATION-ALLEVIATING TERMS TO  
OBLIGATION-IMPOSING TERMS BY CFR TITLE 
 
 
 
in unrule language, with about 1 obligation-alleviating word for every 3 obligation-imposing words—
a finding at odds with common perceptions of tax regulations as exceedingly burdensome (although 
perhaps more consistent with perceptions that they are complex). By contrast, some topical areas that 
might be associated with a heavy presence of lobbyists seeking exemptions and waivers—namely, 
agriculture and mineral resources—fall more on the obligation-imposition end of the spectrum..178 
 
D. Unrules in Economically Significant Regulations 
 
Next, to see whether unrules make regular appearances in the most economically significant 
regulations, we made use of designations drawn from Executive Order 12866.179 Out of the several 
thousand final rules published each year in the Federal Register, only a few hundred are typically 
 
178 This may not be as surprising if one considers the public choice argument that incumbent firms often seek regulation 
as a means of discouraging new entrants and eliminating competition in their industry. For a recent statement of this 
argument, see STEVEN M. TELES & BRINK LINDSEY, THE CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, 
SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND INCREASE INEQUALITY 34 (2017) (arguing that, in a variety of contexts, “regulation . . . shields 
businesses as diverse as auto dealers, funeral directors, and hospitals from competition”).  
179 Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993: Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. No. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993), 
https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. 
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categorized as “significant rules” under the executive order, and only an even more select subset—
usually a few dozen per year—are further categorized as “economically significant.” To be defined as  
economically significant, a regulation must be “likely to have an annual effect on the economy of $100 
million or more.”180  Economically significant regulations receive close scrutiny from the White 
House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), as agencies are required to prepare 
comprehensive estimates of the costs and benefits of both the proposed and final rule.181 Critics of 
regulation often focus on this subset of regulations because of their outsized economic impact.182 
We analyzed the binding language contained in all economically signifiant federal regulations 
issued between 1982 and 2016, which amounted to a total of 1,210 rules. 183  Drawing on our 
dictionary of obligation-imposing and obligation-alleviating words, we again found evidence of 
unrules’ omnipresence. Across all agencies’ economically significant rules, 1 alleviating word 
appeared for about every 6.0 impositional words, with a mean of 32 alleviating terms per rule (median 
of 10) and a mean of 186 impositional terms per rule (median of 61). There were, of course, 
substantial outliers; one rule, for example, contained 761 individual occurrences of alleviating 
terms.184 Overall, it was not surprising that almost every economically significant rule contained at 
least one obligation-imposing word (97 percent), but the vast majority (84 percent) also included at 
least one obligation-alleviating word.  
 
E. Unrules in the U.S. Code 
 
Although our main focus here has been on documenting administrative agencies’ use of 
unrules, the words that agencies use in their regulations must ultimately find authority in statutes 
passed by Congress. Federal statutes often create carveouts that agencies simply parrot in regulatory 
text. Furthermore, statutes also authorize agencies to issue dispensations, either from statutory 
obligations or from obligations contained in agency regulations. We thus looked to statutory law to 
gauge how frequently Congress introduces obligation alleviation into the regulatory corpus, and we 
found that the U.S. Code also exhibits a comparable level of obligation-alleviating language. Across 
the entire statutory corpus, we found 80,566 alleviating terms, which translates to about 1 alleviating 
term for every 6.5 impositional terms.185 The sections of the code governing taxation, bankruptcy, 
and copyrights exhibited some of the most frequent instances of alleviating terms as well as the lowest 
ratios of impositional words to alleviating words—that is, they appear to be the most unrule-laden. 
 We should note, of course, that obligation-imposing and -alleviating language in statutes is 
not always aimed at private actors. An obligation-imposing term such as “shall” might well bind a 
 
180 Regulations and the Rulemaking Process, Executive Office of the President, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last accessed June 21, 2018). 
181 Carey, supra note 162, at 1. 
182 See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Here Are All 205 “Economically Significant” Rules in the Spring 2015 Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulations, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (June 2, 2015), https://cei.org/blog/here-are-all-205-economically-
significant-rules-spring-2015-unified-agenda-federal-regulations. 
183 Prior to the adoption of Executive Order 12,866, rules surpassing the same $100 million threshold were classified as 
“major” under Executive Order 12,291, and these rules are also included here. 
184 See Control of Emissions From Nonroad Spark-Ignition Engines and Equipment, 73 Fed. Reg. 59,034 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
This economically significant rule contained passages chock-full of unrule language, such as the following: “We are 
extending our basic nonroad exemptions to the SD/I engines and vessels covered by this rule. These include the testing 
exemption, the manufacturer-owned exemption, the display exemption, and the national-security exemption. If the 
conditions for an exemption are met, then the engine is not subject to the exhaust emission standards.” Id. at 59,050. 
185 The Code contained a total of 524,647 obligation-imposing terms as of June 2019. 
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business, but it could just as easily obligate an agency or a state to issue a regulation186—or even 
require an agency to issue a waiver.187 Likewise, an obligation-alleviating term might be used to 
permit an agency flexibility to alter its program, perhaps even by imposing new obligations on private 
actors.188  Probably more so than with the agency-level sources of regulatory law, data on federal 
statutes are bound to have some noise to them. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the ratio of alleviating-
to-imposing terms in the U.S. Code is similar to those for the agency sources of regulatory law. 
 
F. Summary and Implications 
 
Across the board, we identify strikingly consistent patterns that reveal an extensive role for 
obligation alleviation in the regulatory state (Table 3). Drawing upon a variety of sources of 
regulatory law, we find one obligation-alleviating word for approximately every six obligation-
imposing words in federal law. The titles of Federal Register documents—representing the agencies’ 
own descriptions of what they are doing—even contain more obligation-alleviating words than 
obligation-imposing words.189 
These findings are all the more powerful because our analysis understates the prevalence and 
significance of unrules in the regulatory state. First, some dispensation-authorizing provisions sweep 
extremely broadly: for example, “The Administrator may waive the provisions of this subpart for a 
manufacturer or a specific engine family.” 190  As such, a single obligation-alleviating word can 
authorize an agency to alleviate the obligations imposed by dozens, if not hundreds and thousands, of 
 
TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF OBLIGATION ALLEVIATING-TO-IMPOSING TERMS 
 
Source Ratio 
Federal Register 1:5.1 
Code of Federal Regulations 1:5.9 
Economically Significant Regulations 1:6.0 
U.S. Code 1:6.5 
 
 
186 See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, From Legislation to Regulation: An Empirical Examination of Agency 
Responsiveness to Congressional Delegations of Regulatory Authority, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 395 (2016) (discussing Congress’s 
ability to impose mandates for rulewriting). For instance, portions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) provide 
that the EPA Administrator “shall promulgate regulations which prescribe procedures . . . for determining whether 
asbestos-containing material is present in a school building under the authority of a local educational agency,” and require 
the Administrator to do so so within 360 days of passage of the statute. 
187 33 U.S.C. § 2310 (“The Secretary [of the Interior] shall waive local cost-sharing requirements up to $200,000 for all 
studies and projects—(1) in American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and (2) for any Indian tribe or tribal organization . . . .”); 7 U.S.C. § 1531 (“[T]he 
Secretary [of Agriculture] shall waive subparagraph (A) if the eligible livestock producer pays a fee in an amount equal to 
the applicable noninsured crop assistance program fee or catastrophic risk protection plan fee required under 
subparagraph (A) . . . .”). 
188  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 60118 (“On application of an owner or operator of a pipeline facility, the Secretary [of 
Transportation] may waive compliance with any part of an applicable standard prescribed under this chapter with respect 
to such facility on terms the Secretary considers appropriate if the Secretary determines that the waiver is not inconsistent 
with pipeline safety.”). 
189 See supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text. 
190 40 C.F.R. § 91.501 (emphasis added). 
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obligation-imposing words. Restrictions rarely have such a multiplicative, omnibus quality because 
the imposition of an obligation must be reasonably defined to have any meaningful communicative 
and behavioral effect. Second, some obligation alleviation occurs without the use of any of the five 
words in our dictionary. In fact, as we discussed in Part I, some unrules are never explicitly spelled 
out or they derive from agencies’ discretion over enforcement.191 Finally, our analysis of regulatory 
texts does not capture all of the dispensations that agencies issue. We did find and measure some 
instances of dispensations in our analysis of Federal Register documents.192  But few agencies are 
obligated to publish their dispensations in the Federal Register.193 The Code of Federal Regulations 
and U.S. Code do not contain any dispensations at all—they contain carveouts and language 
authorizing agencies to issue dispensations. A full accounting of actual dispensations granted by 
agencies would be an enormous, even impossible, project due to the lack of public transparency of 
obligation alleviation.194  
Our analysis of unrules implies the need to reorient thinking about administrative power and 
discretion. For one thing, it is clearly misleading for critics of regulation to continue to imply that the 
growth in the number of pages in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations reveals an 
administrative state bent on imposing obligations. Our empirical findings raise questions about how 
truly restrictive and burdensome federal regulation is in practice. They also raise serious concerns 
about the potential dangers associated with a ubiquitous source of agency discretion. The risks of 
unrules outlined in Part I are real—and they become all the more disquieting once it is clear how 
ubiquitous unrules truly are. 
The purpose of this Part has been to demonstrate that unrules are an omnipresent and 
essential feature of regulatory law. We recognize, of course, that the foregoing analysis, in simply 
aiming to assess the extent of unrules in the regulatory canon, has only scratched the surface of the 
research questions that could be asked about unrules. Future empirical research with these data could 
include studies relating changes in the frequency of unrules to patterns in the amount of delegation 
from Congress to agencies, analyzing unrule trends by Administration, political party control of 
government, or time, and testing whether unrules enable greater aggregate levels of regulation by 
creating escape hatches and flexibility. The significance of such future inquiries should be more than 
evident given our findings that show how ubiquitious unrules are within the administrative state.  
 
III. REORIENTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
 
We now turn to what unrules’ ubiquity means for administrative law.195 Administrative law 
aims to ensure that agency discretion is channeled in ways that can ensure fair decision-making and 
 
191 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (discussing agencies’ broad discretion to decide not to enforce the 
law, analogizing to the “decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict”). 
192 See supra notes 164-166 and accompanying text. 
193 See infra tbl. 3. 
194 See infra Part III. 
195 As we discussed in Part II, statutes also contain unrules or authorize agencies to create unrules. Our discussion here, 
however, focuses on agencies’ power to alleviate obligations. Unlike agencies, which are subject to administrative law, the 
only practical constraints on Congress’s exercise of its constitutionally delegated discretion are political, with courts 
traditionally imposing only a weak form of rational basis review on congressional action.  JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED 
ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 3 
(2018) (“American law has in crucial ways given up on the project of rationality as applied to legislative action.”). Granted, 
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desirable outcomes. With such an important mission, it would seem that administrative law should 
be just as concerned about agency discretion in alleviating obligations as in imposing them, given that 
discretion in both directions can be abused or otherwise lead to problems.196 Yet when it comes to 
unrules, administrative law practice and scholarship have remained out of balance.197 
Consider one of the Supreme Court’s most widely discussed administrative law cases of all 
time: the Benzene Case. In resolving a dispute over a federal health standard, the Court sharply 
constrained the power of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to obligate 
employers to protect their workers from exposure to harmful toxic chemicals in the workplace.198 In 
lowering its standard for air concentrations of benzene, OSHA had argued that, because benzene was 
a carcinogen, the agency could assume that any level of exposure to the chemical put workers at risk. 
Worried that OSHA’s approach to carcinogens would give the agency “sweeping” regulatory power, 
the Court interpreted the underlying statute to demand that, before adopting or revising workplace 
health standards, OSHA demonstrate with “substantial evidence” a “significant risk” of harm.199  
This core of the Benzene Case, constraining the agency’s ability to set regulatory standards, 
epitomizes administrative law’s central concern with obligation imposition. At the same time that the 
Court fixated on OSHA’s power to impose health-related standards, it did absolutely nothing about a 
stunning carveout in OSHA’s benzene decision. The agency had tightened its applicable health 
standard only for workers at refineries and other petrochemical facilities, excluding entirely from the 
coverage of its more protective standard the most numerous category of employees exposed to 
benzene: gas station attendants. To its credit, the Court at least acknowledged that this exclusion of 
service station workers was “particularly significant”200—but it just was not at all legally significant to 
the Court. The Justices said nothing disapproving of OSHA’s decision to leave 800,000 workers out 
of the rule’s coverage and exposed to heightened levels of benzene.201 Instead, they quickly turned to 
enumerating the hundreds of millions of dollars in economic costs that OSHA’s new benzene standard 
would impose on those industries to which it did apply.202 In its holding, the Court sharply rebuked 
OSHA for asserting power to impose standards at nearly any level of workplace risk, agreeing with 
 
questions have arisen under the guise of the nondelegation doctrine about constitutional limits on congressional 
delegations, even in the context of giving so-called “big waiver” authority to agencies. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 74; 
Deacon, supra note 74. But the nondelegation doctrine leaves little room for constraining Congress’s delegation in general, 
whether with respect to imposing or alleviating obligations. See generally Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of Delegation, 167 
U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2019) (showing how limited is the space within which the nondelegation doctrine constrains 
Congress). 
196 See supra Part I.B. 
197 See infra Part III.A. 
198 See Indus. Union Dept’s, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (“Benzene Case”). 
199 Id. at 646. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 628. We do not contend that the Court necessarily should have disapproved OSHA’s carveout, at least not under 
prevailing legal principles. After all, the litigants themselves had not objected to OSHA’s carveout. But it is not unheard 
of for the Supreme Court to use opinions to focus public attention on problematic features in the law that are not, strictly 
speaking, at issue in the case before the Court. It is also not clear who would have objected, especially as service station 
workers were presumably not highly unionized and thus not well-organized to mount a legal challenge that could have 
sought to protect their interests. That very fact, though, helps to illustrate the overall bias in the regulatory state that we 
discuss in this Part. Those entities upon whom an agency imposes obligations will always be able to seek judicial review, 
while it is far less clear who can or will seek such review when agencies alleviate obligations. Some of this bias in judicial 
oversight stems from the law, such as standing doctrine, and some from a political economy that, when combined with 
law, leaves agencies less constrained when alleviating obligation than when imposing them. See infra Part III.B-C. 
202 Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 628. 
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the Court of Appeals that OSHA’s underlying statute did not give the agency “unbridled discretion” 
in setting workplace health standards.203 
Contrast the Benzene Court’s rebuke of broad discretion over obligation imposition with the 
Court’s ready embrace of an agency’s “virtually unbridled discretion” over obligation alleviation in a 
subsequent case, Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.204 As in the Benzene 
Case, the Court in Little Sisters of the Poor confronted a statute that authorized an agency to set 
standards; in the latter case, the standards centered on the type of “preventive care and screenings” 
for women’s health that insurance plans under the Affordable Care Act needed to provide.205 The Act 
did not expressly authorize the agency to make any exceptions in who must provide insurance 
coverage with such preventive care—and arguably the statute’s unqualified command that insurance 
plans under the Act “shall” provide such care specified by the agency even precluded any such 
exceptions.206  But the Court readily concluded that “the same capacious grant of authority that 
empowers the [agency] to make … determinations [of covered care] leaves its discretion equally 
unchecked in other areas, including its ability to identify and create exemptions.”207 
In this Part, we draw out further the contrast exemplified by Little Sisters of the Poor and the 
Benzene Case. We show how administrative law—whether viewed from the standpoint of its 
motivating purposes, its procedures, or its prospects for meaningful judicial review—leaves agency 
discretion to alleviate obligations with less oversight and constraint than similar discretion to impose 
obligations. Of course, we do not mean to suggest that unrules escape scrutiny entirely. Different 
procedural requirements will apply to carveouts than to dispensations, in many instances 
constraining the former more than the latter. Moreover, courts can and do at times review certain 
unrules.208 Nevertheless, it remains clear that administrative law is more readily responsive to the 
concerns of potential obligatees and more focused on protecting private rights against the 
government’s power to impose obligations.209 By pointing to this imbalance, we suggest ways that 
administrative law can and should be reoriented in a direction that would more fully account for the 
risks of unrules. 
 
 
203 Id. at 614-615. 
204 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020). 
205 Id. at 2373. 
206 Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 570-571 (3d Cir. 2019). 
207 140 S. Ct. at 2380. 
208 A number of Supreme Court decisions have involved the review of carveouts, and, unlike with Little Sisters of the Poor, 
they sometimes have resulted in vacatur of the carveout. See, e.g., Utility Air Reg. Grp.v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (holding 
that a carveout for small sources of greenhouse gas emissions was invalid because it could not be reconciled with the text 
of the Clean Air Act). Although judicial challenges to dispensations arise less frequently, they still sometimes occur, as 
with the EPA renewable fuel waivers discussed in Part I. See, e.g., Renewable Fuels Association v. EPA, No. 19-1220 (D.C. 
Cir. Oct. 22, 2019) (challenging RFS small refinery exemption policy changes at the EPA). Although administrative law 
scholars had not previously created a unified framework for the study of unrules, as we have here, they had, as we noted 
earlier, produced important work separately on either dispensations or carveouts. See supra notes 32, 35 and 
accompanying text. 
209 As a very rough indicator of administrative law’s emphasis on obligation imposition, we conducted two searches for 
article titles in the administrative law topical area of Lexis’s law reviews and journals database for the period from January 
1, 1980 to January 1, 2020. One search centered on agency actions:  ti(rule or rulemaking or order). The other used the 
five words in our obligation-alleviating dictionary: ti(waive! or exemp! or variance or except! or exclu!). Even though the 
latter search included more words, as well as their cognates and inflections, we found nearly four times as many article 
titles with just the words “rules,” “rulemaking,” or “order.” We recognize, of course, that these latter words are not a 
perfect proxy for obligation imposition, even though they are widely used in such a manner. 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 38 
 
A. Administrative Law’s Preoccupation with Obligation Imposition 
 
Nearly a hundred years ago, Felix Frankfurter emphasized that administrative law’s central 
concern lay with the power of “legal control” exercised by administrative agencies.210 Throughout 
the last century, administrative law’s raison d’être has been one of protecting individual and economic 
liberty from state intrusion.211 Such an understanding of administrative law permeates much of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which, since its enactment in 1946, has operated as a kind of 
mini-constitution for the modern administrative state.212 The APA sets out the basic framework 
governing rulemaking and adjudication,213 but strikingly it makes at most passing reference in a few 
provisions to agencies’ authority to grant dispensations. 214  The bulk of the statute addresses 
procedures for, and judicial oversight of, agencies’ exercise of their discretion to impose obligations.  
The APA came into existence largely in response to concerns of conservative Republicans and 
Southern Democrats who worried about the intervention of New Deal agencies in private markets.215 
For over a decade before 1946, these politicians allied with the American Bar Association and the 
American Liberty League to push back against the growing power of the administrative state.216 
These conservative forces “sought ‘individual rights,’ which were individuals’ and businesses’ rights 
to prevent an agency from implementing New Deal programs unless the agency both jumped through 
numerous procedural hoops and received the blessing of a conservative federal judge.”217 
 
210 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 614-15 (1927). 
211  See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 378 (1982) (describing administrative law’s “original 
objective” as one of “control[ling] government incursions upon private liberty and property interests”); Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard B. Stewart, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1202-1203 (1981) (“Under the traditional 
model of administrative law, … the system limits the power of government, maintains a well-ordered sphere of private 
liberty, and preserves the system of market exchange.”); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 438-439 (2003) (“The traditional core of administrative law has focused on securing the rule of 
law and protecting liberty … Here the function of administrative law is primarily negative: to prevent unlawful or 
arbitrary administrative exercise of coercive power against private persons.”). 
212 See Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 630 (2017) (“Over the 
decades, the APA has assumed quasi-constitutional status.”); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1208 (2015) (arguing that the APA is the “‘fundamental charter’ of the ‘fourth branch’ of 
government”); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 
(1986) (“[T]he APA is more like a constitution than a statute.”). 
213 5 U.S.C. § 553 (establishing procedures to govern informal rulemaking); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (establishing procedures 
governing adjudication); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (setting out standards governing judicial review of agency action). 
214 Mostly these provisions are found in the definitions section of the APA. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (defining “orders” 
as either “affirmative” or “negative”); id. at § 551(8) (defining “license” to include “statutory exemption or other form of 
permission”); id. at § 551(11) (defining “relief” to include “exemptions” and “exceptions”); id. at § 551(13) (defining “agency 
action” to include the “failure to act”). In one procedural provision, the APA expressly gives unrules a pass, providing that 
agencies do not need to wait the normal 30 days after finalizing a rule for it to take effect if it is “a substantive rule which 
grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction.” Id. at § 553(d)(1). 
215 JOANNA GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59-108 (2012) 
(providing a detailed historical account of the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act); George B. Shepherd, Fierce 
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996); Martin 
Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, and Future, 72 VA. L. REV. (1986). To some degree, the political fight pre-dated the New Deal 
era, see Metzger, supra note 24, at 51  (“Building out the national state was a constant and contested process from the 
Founding through the nineteenth century.”), but never before the APA had the construction of administrative law been 
so explicitly undertaken. 
216 Shepherd, supra note 215; Metzger, supra note 24, at 53. 
217 Shepherd, supra note 215, at 1680. 
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To be sure, contemporary scholarly accounts of the post-enactment history claim that liberal 
New Dealers largely succeeded in convincing courts that provisions in the APA merely restated 
existing principles of administrative law and did not fundamentally alter the balance between 
governmental power and individual rights.218 But even if, in the end, the New Dealers beat back the 
conservative efforts to stop the New Deal,219 the contestation over the APA before and after its 
passage was largely about constraining governmental power to impose obligations, not its power to 
alleviate obligations. New Deal administrative lawyers, like James Landis, were not so much interested 
in legal constraint of any kind on the growing administrative state, believing instead that agencies 
should be imbued with far-ranging discretion and constrained only by professional norms of 
expertise.220 For Landis, the APA’s modest constraints on obligation imposition were largely a token 
concession to conservatives and business interests who were primarily concerned with the effects of 
regulation on economic liberty, and the law’s silence about legal constraints on obligation alleviation 
would most likely have been understood as a virtue, not a vice. 
The APA’s motivating purpose of constraining obligation imposition continues to underpin 
contemporary thinking about administrative law. Since at least the early 1990s, one school of thought 
has lamented what is perceived as the undue constraints that administrative law has placed on 
obligation imposition—constraints that supposedly have “ossified” agencies’ ability to adopt new 
mandates.221  In this widely accepted account, concern about the ossification of rulemaking has 
resulted from both judicial review under the APA222 and the layering of additional legal procedures 
on agencies’ obligation-imposition discretion, including White House oversight of rulemaking.223 
Another contemporary school of thought embraces more of an outright disdain for obligation 
imposition. Drawing attention to a series of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have described as administrative law libertarianism, a 
judicial and scholarly movement that seeks to protect individual rights and an open market against 
government intervention. 224  Although Sunstein and Vermeule argue against administrative law 
exhibiting a strong tilt toward any political theory, let alone making libertarianism its “master 
principle,”225 they still do acknowledge that administrative law “does have libertarian features”226 and 
argue that the “movement toward libertarian principles and outcomes is unmistakable.”227 
Today’s debates over administrative law—its liberatarian as well as its progressive elements—
tend to reflect much of the debate surrounding the APA’s adoption in the 1940s.228 Even concern 
 
218 Kovacs, supra note 212, at 1208; Shapiro, supra note 215. 
219 Kovacs, supra note 212, at 1208. 
220 Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 426 (1996). 
221  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) 
(lamenting the accretion of constraints on rulemaking that have made it harder for agencies to impose new obligations). 
222 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225 (1990) (asserting that the threat of 
judicial review led the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to all but abandon rulemaking); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency 
Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 313 (1988) (suggesting that the burdens and uncertainties created by judicial review 
might make “rulemaking as a vehicle for making policy decisions … soon be relegated to a chapter in a legal history book”). 
223 See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 221. 
224 Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 27, at 398. 
225 Id. at 467. 
226 Id. at 465; see also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Our Illiberal Administrative Law, 10 NYU J. LAW & LIBERTY 
475, 477 (2016). 
227 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 473. 
228 Metzger, supra note 24. 
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over ossification had its antecedents in that earlier period.229 Yet what should be evident is how little 
of the debate then, or now, has revolved around agency power to lift or alleviate obligations. Overall, 
unrules have remained largely in the background—hiding in what we refer to as administrative law’s 
“blind spot.” Administrative law’s relative preoccupation with obligation imposition has obscured the 
extent and importance of agencies’ power to alleviate obligations in consequential ways.230  
 
B. Procedural Manifestations of Administrative Law’s Blind Spot  
 
Administrative law’s blind spot has manifested itself in a variety of procedures that tend to 
give agencies greater discretion when alleviating obligations than when imposing them. When it 
comes to imposing obligations, agencies must follow a variety of steps that aim to promote sound 
decision-making, ensure transparency and opportunities for public participation, and minimize the 
risk of regulatory capture.231 Although some of these requirements are stated neutrally enough that 
at first glance they might appear to apply to carveouts and even some kinds of dispensations, in point 
of fact they do not always apply, or apply with equal vigor, to unrules as they do to rules. 
 
1. Making Rules Versus Unrules 
 
 Under the APA, the basic procedure for creating new obligations calls for agencies to publish 
a notice of a proposed regulation—one that states the actual obligations the agency plans to put into 
law—and then provide an opportunity for members of the public to submit comments on the 
proposal. 232  An agency’s final regulation must be published in the Federal Register. It must also 
constitute a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed regulation, meaning that agencies cannot tack on 
new obligations that were not part of, or closely connected to, the proposed ones.233 Any such new 
 
229 See Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 90 (2008). 
230 See supra Part I. 
231 Much administrative law scholarship focuses on these procedures. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 195, at 44 (“American 
administrative agencies are awash in statutory requirements for reasongiving, analysis, and explanation.”); STEVEN P. 
CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2009) (explaining 
how administrative procedures aim to reduce the risk of capture); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski, Public 
Engagement in Rulemaking, REG. REV. (June 3, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/06/03/santambrogio-
staszewski-public-engagement-rulemaking/ (discussing various procedures for enhancing public participation in 
rulemaking). Of course, we recognize that, just because procedures aim to promote participation in rulemaking, this does 
not mean that vast swaths of the public do in practice get involved in most rulemakings. See also Wendy Wagner, 
Katherine Barnes, & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 99, 125 (2011) (finding that the pre-notice of proposed rulemaking period was “almost completely monopolized by 
regulated parties”); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 964-967 
(2006) (discussing the failure of public participation methods to induce widespread participation of non-elites). 
232  5 U.S.C. § 553. Additional requirements apply if agencies are to impose obligations through so-called formal 
rulemaking or adjudication. See id. at §§ 556-557. When agencies have special justification, they can bypass this comment 
process and publish a final rule without any advance notice. See id. at § 553(b). Note that this is a carveout for the 
procedural rules for making rules. Empirical research suggests the significance of this unrule, as a large proportion of all 
agency rules make use of the good cause exemption. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 
ADMIN. L. REV. 65, 69 (2015) (finding that agencies “exempted approximately 50% of rules from the APA notice-and-
comment process”).  
233 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005)) (noting that the logical 
outgrowth test protects the public from having to “divine [the agency’s] unspoken thoughts” in commenting on a 
proposed rule). 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 41 
 
obligations would necessitate an additional round of notice and comment.234 In addition to these 
procedures grounded in the APA, a variety of additional statutes and executive orders layer 
procedural requirements on top of the APA’s.235 For example, under Executive Order 12,866, any 
proposed regulation deemed economically significant—based on the expected economic impact of its 
new obligations—must be accompanied by a regulatory impact analysis.236 That agency-developed 
analysis must then be reviewed by OIRA before the agency publishes its proposed regulation, and 
then again before the agency makes the regulation final.237  
By contrast, when it comes to obligation alleviation, the required procedures that agencies must 
follow are not as demanding. Of course, the precise procedural steps vary depending on the type of 
unrule. For dispensations, the procedures are virtually nonexistent. Let us start, though, with carveouts.  
The procedures for carveouts would seem to follow those for regulations, simply because 
these unrules are, by definition, effectively embedded in a rule.238 To be sure, carveouts that are 
expressly stated in a proposed regulation will be subject to normal notice and public comment 
requirements. But there is in fact no requirement that carveouts always be stated, let alone stated 
clearly enough to provide notice of the existence of the carveout. OSHA might, for instance, propose 
a regulation that will tighten standards for one class of workplaces without ever saying that similar 
hazards at other workplaces are not encompassed by the proposed rule. Sometimes, a carveout is 
visible only through a kind of “expressio unius” implication—the coverage of one expressly covered 
category of actors or activities implies the exclusion of all others.239 Presumably experts or industry 
insiders would understand the significance of what the agency left out, and the agency would certainly 
need to respond if comments drew attention to an unstated carveout. But, unlike when they are 
imposing new obligations, agencies have no inherent procedural duty with carveouts to state the 
facilities or industries that have been left out of a regulation’s coverage. For the lay public, the 
carveout will be essentially undiscoverable unless third-party intermediaries interpret for them what 
the agency has not said. 
Carveouts added at the end of the rulemaking process would also be less likely to trigger the 
need for supplemental notice to satisfy the logical outgrowth test. An agency satisfies the logical 
outgrowth test if “interested parties should have anticipated that the change was possible, and thus 
reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-comment 
period.”240 Almost by necessity, a subtraction in a regulatory obligation contained in the proposed 
rule will be reasonably foreseeable, so the logical outgrowth test presumably never (or at least rarely) 
bars the alleviation of proposed obligations.241 In fact, Supreme Court precedents approve the wholesale 
 
234 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 160 (2007) (emphasis added). 
235 A few examples include the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601-612, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. 
Chs. 17A, 25, and Exec. Order 13,132, Federalism, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 10. 1999). 
236 Exec. Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 6(a)(3)(C) (Oct. 4, 1993). 
237 Id. at § 6(b). 
238 See infra Part I.A. 
239 Cf. N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 933, 940 (2017) (discussing the interpretive canon expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius—“expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned”—and noting 
that the “force of any negative implication . . . depends on context”). 
240 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
241 See Idaho Conservation League v. Wheeler, 930 F.3d 494, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Under Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent, the EPA’s Final Action not to adopt financial responsibility requirements for the hardrock mining industry 
constitutes a logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule because one logical outgrowth of a proposal is surely . . . to refrain 
from taking the proposed step.”); Veterans Justice Grp. v. Secretary of Veterans Aff’rs, 818 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(same). 
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withdrawal of proposed regulations,242 even though the opposite of that—the proposal of an entirely new 
obligation—would comprise the paradigmatic case which flunks the logical outgrowth test. Given this 
asymmetry, empirical researchers have not surprisingly found that changes during the notice-and-
comment process “are often subtractive rather than innovative or additive.”243 
When it comes to the White House regulatory review process, the procedural asymmetry 
persists. If an agency proposes an amendment to a regulation that would impose obligations creating 
an additional $100 million in annual costs, it will trigger the executive order’s analysis requirement. 244 
But a proposed amendment that would add a carveout and reduce regulated entities’ costs by $100 
million would simply not appear on OIRA’s radar screen. 245  It is widely understood that OIRA 
scrutinizes obligation imposition much more than it worries about the alleviation of needed 
obligations.246 OIRA is even said to let agency decisions that lighten regulatory burdens “get a pass.”247  
 
242 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 175 (2007) (“Since the proposed rule was simply a proposal, its 
presence meant that the Department was considering the matter; after that consideration the Department might choose to 
adopt the proposal or to withdraw it. As it turned out, the Department did withdraw the proposal . . . . We do not understand 
why such a possibility was not reasonably foreseeable.”). The Long Island Care at Home case presents an interesting twist on 
an unrule: the Department of Labor initially proposed a rule changing its longstanding unrule excluding certain 
companionship workers from the the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “domestic services” exemption, and therefore including 
these workers in wage and hour regulations that otherwise apply to workers. But after comment, the Department withdrew 
the rule, restoring the unrule. The Court refused to see any role for the logical outgrowth doctrine, noting that the “proposed 
rule was simply a proposal” and that complete abandonment of the effort to close the carveout was foreseeable given any lack 
of commitment on the part of the Department. Much the same logic applies to other efforts at obligation alleviation. 
243 William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: 
An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 67 (2004). See also William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The 
Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 581 (2009) (calling attention to 
“the need to provide adequate notice is a bias in favor of subtractive changes in proposed rules”); Wagner, Barnes, & 
Peters, supra note 231, at 132 (finding that “comments to strengthen the rule were not only fewer in number but were 
less successful as compared with their counterparts striving to weaken the rule”). 
244 The executive order calls for analyses of rules expected to have an annual economic impact of $100 million or more, by which OIRA 
means costs. See Executive Order 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 6 (Oct. 4, 1993), https://www.archives 
.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. Similar statutory requirements are also triggered by obligation imposition. 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. ( “significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities”); Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. (“the expenditure . . . by the private sector, of $100 million in any one year”). 
245 The way Executive Order 12,866 is written, to call for analysis when new regulations would have an “annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy,” 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(f)(1), 
should demand review even if cost-savings (a benefit) are of sufficient magnitude to push a proposed regulation over the 
threshold. But we have been told by former OIRA personnel that the only impacts that matter for this threshold are costs. 
246 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2012) 
(arguing that OIRA should look to rulemaking petitions to identify areas where agencies should regulate but are not and to 
subject these areas to regulatory review of inaction). For a short time under the leadership of Administrator John Graham, OIRA 
would issue occasional “prompt letters” to encourage agencies to look into the possibility of imposing obligations to address new 
risks or neglected problems, but the number of such prompt letters was but a small fraction of OIRA’s reviews of new rules, and 
agencies had no obligation to accept OIRA’s suggestion that it impose new regulations. See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through 
Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 460-63 (2008). Furthermore, while we recognize that Executive Order 
12,866 and OIRA guidance provide that agencies should analyze alternatives in their regulatory impact analyses, the agency 
chooses what these alternatives are and they need not necessarily have anything to do with unrules. As a practical matter, for 
reasons discussed in Part III.B.2 about transparency, it will be easier for strategically minded agencies to obscure carveouts and 
escape OIRA oversight of them than it is to escape OIRA scrutiny of rules. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under 
Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1777 (2012) (discussing strategies agencies use to evade OIRA scrutiny). 
247 Michael Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock,17 N.Y.U. ENVT. L. J. 107, 117 (2008). See also 
Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1272 (2006) 
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OIRA’s tendency toward lighter scrutiny of carveouts was only exacerbated by President 
Trump’s Executive Order 13,771 (the so-called “1-in-2-out” order). 248  This order imposed a 
regulatory budgeting regime based solely on the costs of regulatory obligations and has required that, 
“for every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for elimination” to 
offset the costs of the new regulation.249  Neither the executive order nor OIRA’s implementing 
guidance provided any assurance that the agency or OIRA will do anything to estimate the lost 
benefits from the regulatory obligations alleviated or eliminated.250 All in all, Executive Order 13,771 
gave agencies additional incentives for amending regulations to carve out obligations rather than to 
impose new ones.251 
When it comes to dispensations, administrative law’s procedural disparities are at their most 
stark. Most dispensations—of which simple decisions not to pursue enforcement are surely the most 
numerous—are granted through informal adjudication, about which the APA says virtually 
nothing.252 Of course, this absence of procedural attention also applies to any obligation-imposing 
informal adjudications, but, even so, obligation-alleviating dispensations will be inherently less 
constrained. An obligation-imposing informal adjudication needs to be based on some underlying 
obligation established through a more structured process. By contrast, obligations can be alleviated 
informally without anything more than the exercise of an agency’s enforcement discretion.253 
Even when an agency’s dispensations have been based on an underlying agency process—such 
as the establishment of authority to grant dispensations in a regulation—that underlying process will 
treat dispensation authority more lightly. For example, provisions in a proposed agency regulation 
that would authorize dispensations in the future will be basically given a free pass with respect to the 
White House regulatory review process. The possible effects of a waiver-authorizing provision in an 
otherwise economically significant new regulation simply do not figure into OIRA’s review.254 Yet as  
 
(suggesting that “OIRA does not carefully scrutinize deregulatory cost-benefit analyses.”); Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory 
Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006) (“[W]hen agencies have offered proposals that involve 
deregulation rather than increased regulation, OIRA has not required a cost-benefit analysis.”); Oliver A. Houck, President X and 
the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 542 (1987) (“[OMB] has applied its criteria selectively, requiring no 
analysis for proposals that eliminate regulation, and no cost analysis for those that relax existing standards.”). 
248 Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
249 Id. 
250 Joshua Linn & Alan Krupnick, Ninety-Six Regulatory Experts Express Concerns about Trump Administration Reforms, 
RESOURCES (May 24, 2017), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/ninety-six-regulatory-experts-express-
concerns-about-trump-administration-reforms/. 
251 Susan Dudley, Regulating Within a Budget, REG. REV. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/04/23/ 
dudley-regulating-within-a-budget/  (explaining how Executive Order 13,771 and related initiatives “provide new 
incentives for agency staff to examine existing regulations with the intent to modify or rescind cost-ineffective 
requirements”). 
252 Croston, supra note 131, at 301. Although Congress has sometimes separately imposed specific procedural constraints 
on how agencies issue dispensations, these procedures vary dramatically depending on the specific dispensation program 
at issue, leaving this area of the law in what scholars have described as, at best, “procedural disarray.” Shapiro & Glicksman, 
supra note 32, at 1161; see also id. at 1166 (“Congress has failed to specify procedures for many back-end adjudications; and 
… the process used for back-end adjustments varies from statute to statute, and even within a statute.”); Nielson, supra 
note 33, at 39-40. 
253 As discussed further in Part III.D, judicial review of obligation-alleviating informal adjudications is also less likely. 
254  Cf. Circular A-4—Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Sept. 17, 2003), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis- 
a-primer.pdf (making no mention of quantifying the impacts of possible waivers or exemptions). The absence of any 
explicit attention to the possibility of future dispensations in Circular A-4 matches what we have been told in 
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we have seen, sometimes subsequent waivers can work to a real detriment to a rule’s purpose.255 For 
example, when EPA has in the past analyzed the economic impacts of its annual establishment of 
renewable fuel standards, neither the agency’s Federal Register preambles nor its underlying regulatory 
impact analyses have included any quantified estimates showing how the benefits or costs of the rule 
might vary depending on whether the agency were to grant hardship exemptions authorized by the 
statute.256 
In ways like these, agencies receive greater procedural room to maneuver when they alleviate 
obligations than when they impose them. This is not to say that unrules escape all procedural 
scrutiny—at least not all types of unrules. But overall, administrative procedure tends to treat unrules 
with a lighter touch compared to agency actions imposing new obligations on private actors. 
 
2. Tilted Transparency  
 
Obligation imposition is also subject to more demanding requirements for transparency than 
is obligation alleviation. Under the transparency provisions of the APA—also known as the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA)—all agency “substantive rules of general applicability” must be published 
in the Federal Register, with no exceptions.257  
Although this strict publication requirement for obligation imposition will also ensure the 
transparency of expressly stated carveouts, implicit carveouts can be obscured within, or even left out 
entirely of, the text of a regulation.258 Furthermore, dispensations can be completely opaque, such as 
they will necessarily be when they result from handshake agreements or no-action letters exchanged 
 
conversations with OIRA staff, namely that the regulatory impact analysis process basically assumes away any future 
obligation alleviation. In effect, the neglect of dispensation authority essentially means OIRA assumes that a new 
regulation will be fully implemented or that any waivers will be minimal or applied only when doing so will be net 
beneficial. 
255 For a discussion of the risks of unrules, see infra Part I. 
256  Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS2) Regulatory Impact Analysis, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2010), https:// 
nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P1006DXP.txt; Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2018 and 
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2019, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,486 (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/ 
content/pkg/FR-2017-12-12/pdf/2017-26426.pdf.  The preamble to the EPA’s renewal of the fuel standard for the 2018-
2019 period actually went out of its way to mention that “at this time no exemptions have been approved for 2018”—even 
though media reports indicate that the agency had been fielding requests for waivers from Carl Icahn’s refinery and 
upwards of two dozen other refineries. 82 Fed. Reg. at 58,523. See Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Exclusive: EPA Gives 
Giant Refiner a “Hardship” Waiver from Regulation, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-
epa-refineries-exclusive/exclusive-epa-gives-giant-refiner-a-hardship-waiver-from-regulation-idUSKCN1HA21P; Jarrett 
Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Exclusive: Chevron, Exxon Seek “Small Refinery” Waivers from U.S. Biofuels Law, REUTERS (Apr. 
12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-epa-refineries-exclusive/exclusive-chevron-exxon-seek-small- 
refinery-waivers-from-u-s-biofuels-law-idUSKBN1HJ32R. 
257 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D). In addition, the Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12,866 require each agency 
twice each year to release an agenda of essentially all the rules they are planning to develop, so the public can keep track 
of rules even before they are formally proposed. The E-Government Act also requires notices of proposed rulemakings 
to be made available online, see E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 206, 112 Stat. 2681 (2002), and the 
federal government has created both Regulations.gov and an online version of the Federal Register to facilitate online access 
to rulemaking information. Regulations.gov: Your Voice in Federal Decision-Making, https://www.regulations.gov/ (last 
accessed Feb. 17, 2020); Federal Register: The Daily Journal of the United States Government, Nat’l Archives, https:// 
www.federalregister.gov (last accessed Feb. 17, 2020). 
258 See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. 
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just between agencies and regulatory obligatees.259 Granted, some agencies do, on their own accord, 
provide transparency even with respect to dispensations—the FCC, for example, deserves credit for 
docketing waiver requests and decisions online 260 —but these voluntary efforts to provide 
transparency surrounding dispensations are far from the norm. 
To assess the public availability of information about dispensations, we examined random 
samples of 75 provisions each in the U.S. Code and CFR that authorize agencies to grant dispensations 
to regulated businesses.261 We first reviewed the relevant statutory or regulatory text to determine 
whether it contained any requirements related to public disclosure of its dispensations—even if only 
information about their existence or the way to petition for relief. Only 15 and 20 percent of the 
provisions in our samples, respectively, contained anything remotely looking like a requirement or 
recommendation that an agency disclose any information about these dispensations (Table 4). 
Although we could find some information online about some of the dispensations authorized by these 
provisions, for more than half we could find no information about even their possible existence. For 
no more than 20 percent of the dispensations authorized did agencies provide lists indicating for 
whom they had waived an obligation.  
 
 
TABLE 4: TRANSPARENCY OF DISPENSATIONS 
AUTHORIZED IN STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 Agencies’ general policies of non-enforcement—which follow from the same discretion that allows agencies to grant 
dispensations but act effectively at carveouts—may even arguably be kept from disclosure to the public as “information 
compiled for law enforcement” that “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(7). 
260 FCC can waive any of its own regulations under 47 C.F.R. § 1.925, and it further has significant waiver authority to 
“forbear” enforcement of provisions of the Communications Act under 47 U.S.C. § 160. See Deacon, supra note 74. 
Although this sweeping dispensation authority does not require transparency, the FCC maintains a comprehensive and 
open-access database in which any individual can search for relevant information on a request for waiver or forbearance. 
Available information includes the docketing of the petition, the collection of public comments (itself a self-imposed but 
laudable reform in the domain of dispensations), and the Commission’s final decisions. See FCC, EDOCS, 
https://www.fcc.gov/edocs (last accessed June 21, 2020). The quality of these records may be one reason why the FCC’s 
dispensations also appear to be more routinely subjected to scrutiny by reviewing courts, see, e.g., Ad Hoc 
Telecommunications Users Committee v. FCC, 572 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding against an arbitrary and 
capricious challenge the FCC’s decision to grant forbearance of dominant-carrier regulation to incumbent local exchange 
carriers). After all, “[a]dequate review of a determination requires an adequate record, if the review is to be meaningful.” 
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).  
261 We created the sample by searching in Lexis through the U.S. Code and the Code of Federal Regulations for section 
headings that have the terms waiver, exemption, or variance (using the search section(waiver or variance or exemption)), and 
then coding a random subsample of the results.  Trained research assistants working under our close direction conducted 
the coding, with intercoder reliability measures all in the acceptable range. 
 
 
 
Source 
 
Percentage with 
Transparency 
Requirement 
Percentage 
with Any 
Online 
Information 
Percentage with a 
List of 
Dispensation 
Recipients 
U.S. Code  15 39 20 
C.F.R. 20 47 16 
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 Based on our analysis, it is clear that the U.S. administrative state tolerates a considerable 
degree of secrecy over dispensations, even though the federal government is governed by a systematic 
requirement to ensure that rules are openly available to all.262 The notion of secret obligations is 
antithetical to the rule of law263—but not so, it seems, is the existence of secret alleviations of 
oblgiations.  
 
3. The Lack of Self-Reinforcing Incentives  
 
Another asymmetry exists in agencies’ incentives to comply with procedural and transparency 
requirements for rules versus unrules. That is, even if agencies did need to follow identical procedural 
steps or to disclose the same information when imposing an obligation as when alleviating one, they 
will necessarily have an inherent reason for following those requirements when creating rules that 
does not apply when creating unrules.  
Procedural and transparency requirements become effectively self-reinforcing with respect to 
obligation imposition.264  This is because obligations are really only obligatory when an agency can 
enforce them. But agency officials know that, if they ever wish to enforce a regulation, they must have 
followed the proper procedural steps in developing it, including publishing the regulation in the 
Federal Register.265 With respect to transparency requirements, failure to provide proper notice gives 
any purported obligatee a Fifth Amendment’s Due Process objection to any enforcement.266 Both the 
Federal Register Act and the APA also make clear that any regulation that has not been properly 
published cannot be enforced.267 Unless an agency has given an obligatee sufficient actual notice, “a 
person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required 
to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”268 Even in cases where the technical 
requirements of publication arguably have been met, courts stand ready to police the boundaries of 
“fair notice” for regulatory obligatees who become the target of enforcement without sufficient 
warning.269  
 
262 One exception to this trend in openness of regulations that has provoked considerable objections from scholars and 
some governmental reforms lies with the practice of incorporation by reference. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Private 
Control over Access to Public Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2014); 
Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013). 
263 FULLER, supra note 68, at 49-51; Jonathan Manes, Secret Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 803, 808 (2018) (analyzing the use of secret 
law in the executive branch and identifying “distinct characteristics of specific secret laws that make them particularly 
odious—or particularly benign”). 
264  For a discussion of the self-reinforcing nature of transparency requirements, see Cary Coglianese, Illuminating 
Regulatory Guidance, 9 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 243, 246-247, 269 (2020). On self-reinforcing rules more generally, 
see Edward K. Cheng, Structural Law and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655 (2006). 
265 See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (providing that “agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement”); 
id. at § 706(2)(D) (providing as a basis for setting aside agency action the lack of “observance of procedure required by law”). 
266 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
267 On the need for rules to be published if they are to be treated as valid, see 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (“A document required … 
to be published in the Federal Register is not valid as against a person who has not had actual knowledge of it until … a 
copy [is] made available for public inspection ....”); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(E) (similarly precluding any validity to regulations 
or other documents required to be published in the Federal Register); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (requiring publication 
in the Federal Register of agencies’ notices of proposed rulemaking). 
268 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(E). 
269 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“In the absence of notice—for example, 
where the regulation is not sufficiently clear to warn a party about what is expected of it—an agency may not deprive a 
party of property by imposing civil or criminal liability.”). 
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Unrules, by contrast, do not bring with them the same inherent self-reinforcing incentives 
for agencies to follow procedural and transparency requirements. With an unrule, the agency does not 
want to bring an enforcement action. It is seeking to alleviate obligations, not to create a duty that 
could be backed up by the threat of enforcement. As a result, with unrules, any procedural defects or 
failures to provide required transparency will not necessarily impede the agency from achieving its 
obligation-alleviation goal.270 The agency will still typically be able to accomplish the same objective 
simply by refraining from enforcing a rule against those entities included in a procedurally defective 
unrule.271  
Thus, even though procedural niceties and robust transparency constitute defining features 
of administrative law,272 agency compliance with procedural and transparency requirements is not as 
likely to be symmetric as between rules and unrules.273 Even if the same procedural and transparency 
requirements applied to unrules as to rules (which they do not), agencies have less reason to comply 
with these requirements when it comes to unrules.274 
 
 
270  This is similar to the problem in getting agencies to make transparent non-binding guidance documents. See 
Coglianese, Illuminating Regulatory Guidance, supra note 264. An agency’s failure to follow a transparency requirement in 
issuing guidance does not, as an intrinsic legal matter, deprive the agency of what it often intends to achieve by issuing 
guidance, namely, to communicate information—at least to those who in fact receive such guidance. Mandating 
transparency on its own simply does not provide an intrinsic incentive for agencies to follow those mandates for guidance 
or for obligation alleviation in the same way that they inherently provide an incentive with respect to obligation 
imposition. 
271 Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Of course, this is not to deny that sometimes agencies could still have 
other incentives to comply with applicable transparency and procedural requirements. For example, sometimes 
agencies may not be able to accomplish the same policy objective through non-enforcement, especially in those 
instances where a private right of action exists. Nevertheless, it remains that there will not be the same intrinsic 
incentive for unrules that exists with the imposition of obligations, since in the latter case an agency’s ability to 
threaten to enforce new obligations will always be conditional on its having followed the applicable procedural and 
transparency requirements. 
272 CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE 
POLICY 63-70 (2018); Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public Participation in the 
Federal Rulemaking Process, 77 G.W.U. L. REV. 924, 930-931 (2009). 
273 On top of these legal structures that make procedural and transparency requirements self-reinforcing when agencies 
impose obligations, agencies also have a practical incentive to make their obligations widely known. When they impose 
legal obligations, they seek to affect obligatees’ behavior, which can only happen if those obligatees know about a rule. Cf. 
Walters, supra note 154, at 160 & n.341 (highlighting that agency staff, particularly lawyers, push agencies to clarify legal 
obligations ex ante to improve compliance with regulation). This reason presumably does not apply with the same force 
for those carved out of a rule. 
274 Although in theory members of the public could rely on FOIA and request information about agencies’ carveouts and 
dispensations, they must take on the expense of litigating the request if it is rejected. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4). This is hardly 
on par with the proactive or affirmative disclosure that is encouraged by prohibitions on enforcement of non-transparent 
obligations. Often, requests for information about carveouts or dispensations are akin to a fishing expedition, since the 
requestor may not know the bounds of what exists. See generally Stephanie Alvarez-Jones, ‘Too Big to FOIA’: How Agencies 
Avoid Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1055, 1064-1066 (2018) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 
552(a)(3)(A), which requires an agency to respond only to requests that “reasonably describe[]” the records sought). 
Decisions to carve out certain actors or activities from the scope of a rulemaking might be made early on in the process 
before there was any requirement to publish the proposed rule text, and such informal, preliminary decisions may have 
no documentation whatsoever. Likewise, dispensations could have been made entirely informally—memorialized in a 
private letter or verbal assurance, rather than in the pages of the Federal Register. For all of these reasons, members of the 
public will frequently lack enough knowledge even to know to ask for a specific dispensation for which they might need 
information. After all, it was only because of a leak to the press that the public learned about EPA’s decision to grant 
waivers to Carl Icahn’s refinery and dozens of other refineries. See Renshaw & Prentice, supra note 119. 
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C. Lopsidedness in Judicial Oversight 
 
Without knowledge of even the existence of an unrule, it is impossible for those negatively 
affected by it to challenge it in court.275 But even with such knowledge, those who seek judicial review 
of agency actions alleviating obligations can still face disproportionate barriers to relief—ultimately 
leaving unrules with what tends to be a somewhat lopsided degree of judicial oversight. In this section, 
we explain why judicial oversight can be expected to be both less available and less searching for 
unrules. 
 
1. Barriers to Legal Mobilization 
 
The lopsidedness to judicial oversight of unrules begins with a bias in terms of who is more 
likely to bring agency actions to the courts for review—and whether those actions are more likely to 
be rules or unrules. Administrative law—and the courts’ ability to reinforce that law—finds itself 
particularly susceptible to a bias in the mobilization of legal claims.276 Courts are reactive institutions 
that depend on affected interests bringing issues to them for their review. To activate administrative 
law, affected interests must have resources—information, time, money, and connections. Disparities 
in such resources within society in practice lead to imbalances of power and, ultimately, to a bias in 
judicial oversight of the administrative state.  
Pathbreaking studies by Mancur Olson and James Q. Wilson have illuminated fundamental 
dynamics that contribute to a bias in legal mobilization. Olson focused on the political economy 
underlying the provision of collective goods—where all members of the public can benefit from a 
policy even if they do not contribute to its implementation.277 In such circumstances, Olson showed 
that individuals have an incentive to free ride and let someone else work to bring about the collective 
good. This basic logic means that collective goods will often go undersupplied, impeded largely by the 
transaction costs of “identifying, organizing, and coordinating” groups of individuals with shared but 
individually modest interests—and then getting them to cooperate and invest in collective action.278  
Wilson, for his part, applied a similar logic to explain the behavior of groups active in 
regulatory politics. He started with the basic truth that any regulation creates benefits for some 
individuals or groups while imposing costs on others. He then showed that the prospects for group 
mobilization to resist costs or claim benefits depend on how these costs and benefits are distributed. 
According to Wilson, when a regulatory position “will confer general (though perhaps small) benefits 
at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society,” then the “incentive to organize is strong 
 
275 Cf. Renewable Fuels Association v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Petition for Review (D.C.  Cir., June 4, 
2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-06/documents/rfa_pfr_06042018.pdf (noting that “EPA did 
not even provide public notice that it had received or had acted upon any requests for an extension of a small refinery 
exemption,” and arguing that therefore the filing deadline should not apply). 
276 Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider called this a “mobilization of bias,” by which he meant “a bias in favor of the 
exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others” that meant that “[s]ome issues are organized into 
politics while others are organized out of it.” E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 71 (1960). 
277 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (“If the 
members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common 
or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the 
achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that 
they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives.” (emphasis in original)). 
278 Aziz Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 220 (2014) (citing 
OLSON, JR., supra note 277, at 22, 33-36).  
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 49 
 
for the opponents of the policy but weak for the beneficiaries, and since the political system provides 
many points at which opposition can be registered, it may seem astonishing that regulatory legislation 
of this sort is ever passed.”279 
Together, Olson’s and Wilson’s work reveals that the deck will likely often be stacked against 
the diffuse beneficiaries of regulation, especially when they are up against concentrated targets of 
regulation—the cost-bearers—who are better able to overcome inertia and mobilize to activate 
administrative law to constrain agencies in their imposition of obligations. Those upon whom 
obligations are imposed directly bear the associated costs of regulatory burdens and have reason to 
go to court to challenge the obligations. And, on the flipside, the creation of carveouts and the 
granting of dispensations can be enormously valuable to regulated entities facing the imposition of 
costly obligations, while any harms from unrules—such as in terms of unrealized regulatory benefits 
to the general public—may only manifest as diffuse losses, which will be more difficult to organize to 
resist through litigation.  
One might think about the exemption Carl Icahn and big oil companies secured from the 
normal obligation of petroleum refineries to use renewable fuels.280 Icahn’s company gained big; it 
had a strong incentive to get involved in the process to secure an exemption. Meanwhile, individual 
members of the general public who might have stood to gain from having more renewable fuel in the 
nation’s fuel supply—to the extent that such fuel delivers environmental benefits or reduces the 
nation’s vulnerability to global oil price shocks—each presumably lost only a small fraction of the 
overall benefit that the rule would deliver, if applied broadly. This basic bias in the incentives for legal 
mobilization has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies.281 
What this bias means for judicial oversight of rules versus unrules is that those who would 
lose from unrules are less likely to activate the courts to uphold the parts of administrative law that 
conceivably do apply to unrules.282 In other words, the lopsidedness in judicial review between rules 
and unrules begins even before any lawsuits are filed. Differences in incentive structures and litigant 
resources will likely mean that agencies’ efforts to alleviate obligations systematically receive less 
judicial scrutiny than efforts to impose obligations. 
 
2. Barriers to Getting Into Court 
 
The bias in legal mobilization is only reinforced by the doctrine of standing—a constitutional 
prerequisite to invoking the “judicial power” of federal courts. As the Supreme Court has articulated 
 
279 WILSON, supra note 110, at 370. 
280 See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. 
281 See, e.g., FRANK M. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY (2009); 
Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-Proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 
22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 3737 (2012); Susan Webb Yackee & Jason Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? 
Assessing Interest Group Influence on the US Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006). But see CROLEY, supra note 231 (qualifying 
public choice accounts of regulatory processes); Gabriel Scheffler, Failure to Capture: Why Business Does Not Control the 
Rulemaking Process, 79 MD. L. REV. 700, 704 (2020) (arguing that “the view of the rulemaking process as captured is not 
warranted.”). By no means, of course, does the existence of this bias mean that industry always wins in the regulatory 
state. See generally MICHAEL E. KRAFT & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: CORPORATE 
INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (2007) (showing how businesses do not always prevail in the policy 
process).  
282 We acknowledge that, as Richard Stewart has argued, today’s interest group climate is surely more balanced than it 
was prior to the 1960s, but this does not mean it no longer exhibits any bias. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975). 
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in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife283 and subsequent cases, for a federal court to review agency action, a 
challenger must meet three well-known elements: (i) a “concrete and particularized” injury that is 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (ii) a “causal connection between the injury and 
the conduct complained of;” and (iii) a demonstration that a favorable court decision can redress the 
injury.284 Almost by definition, these elements can be readily satisfied for anyone upon whom the 
government has imposed a new obligation: the injury is the imposed obligation, which is caused by 
the challenged imposition and is fully redressable if a court finds the government acted unlawfully.285  
Yet for anyone challenging an unrule, showing a “particularized” injury will often prove more 
difficult, especially when the harm from an unrule is spread across the public rather than lodged in 
any particular individual who can demonstrate concretely that they will be or have been affected.286 
On precisely these grounds, courts in recent years have been somewhat more reluctant to grant 
standing to organizations seeking to challenge agency actions that avoid or lessen regulatory 
obligations.287 
 
283 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
284 Id. at 560-561. 
285 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (noting that the Court has “held that a plaintiff satisfies 
the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a 
constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.’”) (quoting 
Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).; see also Public Citizen v. Trump, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 
No. 17-253 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/pc_v._trump.pdf (“It is relatively easy to 
establish standing when you are the regulated party; it is more difficult to do so when the government fails to regulate the 
conduct of someone else.”); Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 27, at 457 (“[T]he 
requirements of causation and redressability … might well be used to prevent regulated entities from having access to 
court on the ground that it is purely speculative whether a judicial ruling—for example, requiring compliance with some 
procedural requirement—will actually redress the alleged injury. But we have been unable to find even a single case in 
which the court of appeals has used standing doctrine in that way.”). Courts have on occasion erected other barriers to 
the redress of grievances about unrules. See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (allowing EPA 
exemptions to remain in place despite concluding that the EPA “failed to provide adequate notice and comment” in part 
because “no party challenged the specific exemptions set by the EPA”). 
286 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (“When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s 
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.” (emphasis in original)). See 
generally Karl S. Coplan, Petition Clause Interests and Standing for Judicial Review of Administrative Lawmaking, Admin. & 
Reg. L. News, Spring 2009, at 3 (“Current standing doctrine … favors petitioning activity by [those] arguing for less 
regulation, for whom standing is presumed, while it disfavors petitioning activity by regulatory beneficiaries arguing for 
more regulation, who … must meet a high burden of establishing distinct ‘injury in fact,’ causation, and redressibility….”); 
Zachary J.F. Kolodin, Standing to Challenge Regulatory Failure in the Age of Preemption, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 166 (2015) 
(“Since industrial actors are regulated directly … it is far more likely that an industrial actor's complaint with respect to a 
regulation will suffice for standing than will a regulatory beneficiary's complaint.”). Although it may be more difficult to 
satisfy the standing test when challenging unrules, we do not deny that it still may be possible. After all, as Justice 
Kavanaugh has noted in a plurality opinion, “the Court has squarely held that a plaintiff who suffers unequal treatment 
has standing to challenge a discriminatory exception that favors others.” Barr v. American Association of Political 
Consultants, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 2335 (2020) (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984)). It may be that competitors of 
firms that benefit from an unrule may be able to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement more easily than other types of 
unrule challengers. 
287 Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 27, at 453–54 (noting that in recent years the D.C. 
Circuit “has invoked the injury-in-fact test to deny standing to environmental, labor, and consumer organizations 
complaining of what they see as insufficient regulation”). These patterns in standing cases are traceable to the intellectual 
foundations of administrative law, which elevates the protection of private rights and property above public rights. Cass 
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1433 (1988) (noting that, in the U.S. 
administrative law tradition, “[t]he interests of regulated industries could be protected through the courts, whereas the 
interests of regulatory beneficiaries were to be vindicated through politics or not at all”). 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 51 
 
As a result, the individual target of a new obligation will almost categorically and 
definitionally be able to object to its imposition. But objections to obligation alleviation will be less 
likely to be heard by the courts. Those most directly affected—the recipient of a dispensation or the 
beneficiary of a carveout—will hardly ever object, 288  leaving third parties as the only potential 
challengers.289 Standing doctrine will often present a meaningful barrier for those third parties to 
overcome if they wish to challenge an unrule.290 
 
3. Less Searching Judicial Review 
 
Even when litigants can overcome standing barriers, other doctrines tend to make courts’ 
scrutiny on the merits less searching in cases involving certain kinds of unrules. When dispensations 
derive from an agency’s exercise of its nonenforcement discretion in individual cases, for example, 
prevailing doctrine makes these unrules virtually immune from judicial review altogether.291  In 
Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that agencies’ decisions not to enforce presumptively fall 
within the unreviewable category of actions “committed to agency discretion by law.”292 For similar 
reasons, courts reviewing waivers issued under generally standardless authorizations—for example, 
an agency “may waive” 293 —will be more likely to deem such unrules as committed to agency 
discretion.294 A district court recently held completely unreviewable the Department of Homeland 
Security’s waiver of some two dozen laws that otherwise could have applied to the construction of a 
wall on the border with Mexico. 295  Even when a waiver is deemed reviewable, some courts 
sometimes appear to apply a lighter-touch arbitrariness review to such unrules.296 
 
288 The recipient of a dispensation presumably would object only if it believes a waiver it received was more limited than 
one to which it was entitled by statute. See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312. 
289 Although Section 555(b) of the APA opens the possibility of third-party intervention during agency adjudications, 
courts treat such intervention as discretionary at best. See Nichols v. Board of Trustees of Asbestos Workers Local 24 
Pension Plan, 835 F.2d 881, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
290 The D.C. Circuit has noted that “when the [party] is not … the object of the government action or inaction [being] 
challenge[d], standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” New World Radio, 
Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 170 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992), and 
holding that a radio station licensee could not challenge the grant of a license of a competitor station).  
291 Cf. Vermeule, supra note 43 (surveying a number of “holes” that limit the coverage of the conventional presumption 
of reviewability). 
292 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). The Court justified its holding in Heckler in part by reference to concerns 
about regulators infringing on individual liberty, writing that “when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise 
its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often 
are called upon to protect.” Id. at 832. 
293 See, e.g.,  supra notes 190 and accompanying text.  
294 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830 (interpreting § 701(a)(2) as applying when there are no “meaningful 
standards” to guide judicial review of an agency’s actions). Or, if courts do find the agency action reviewable in such instances, 
the spongy nature of the statutory standard would probably entitle the government to deference. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But see MCI Telecommunications v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 512 
U.S. 218 (1994) (declining to defer to the FCC’s broad construction of authority to “modify” a legal requirement). 
295 Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D.D.C. 2019). 
296 C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis review 
to HHS’s granting of a Section 1115 waiver to New Jersey and rejecting out of hand the suggestion that the “absence of 
formal findings” rendered the granting of the waiver arbitrary and capricious so long as “the Secretary rationally could 
have determined that the FDP was ‘likely to assist in promoting the objectives’ of AFDC”). Of course, we acknowledge 
that there are cases where the courts do look carefully at unrules. See Utility Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 
414, 426-30 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (vacating 40 C.F.R. § 257.101). 
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The story is not much different once an agency takes an action to impose obligation on some 
actors or activities, but could have plausibly gone further to encompass other similar actors or 
activities. Although one might think that simple arbitrary and capricious principles would permit 
regulatory beneficiaries to challenge an agency’s decision not to impose an obligation related to the 
purpose or scope of the rule,297 that is not always the case. Courts have developed a host of doctrines 
that tend to bless such agency decisions to hold back on obligation imposition—or at least to treat 
them with little serious scrutiny. For instance, the “de minimis doctrine” amounts effectively to a 
judicial approval of limited exemptions for certain conduct, as long as the obligations that would 
otherwise apply are so minor that they would only “yield a gain of trivial or no value.”298 It has even 
been said that the power to develop exceptions is “inherent in most statutory schemes,” even when 
the text does not specifically authorize such power.299 
A related “administrative necessity” doctrine can sometimes allow agencies to develop more 
categorical exemptions even when statutes provide no explicit authorization.300 As the D.C. Circuit 
in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle has explained, categorical exemptions should be allowed “where the 
conventional course” for dealing with impossibility through “case-by-case determinations . . . would, 
as a practical matter, prevent the agency from carrying out the mission assigned to it by Congress.”301 
In other words, rather than expending resources administering dispensations, an agency will 
sometimes be allowed to save itself time by writing a carveout.  
Finally, agencies can also sidestep challenges to carveouts by invoking the “one-step-at-a-
time” doctrine. In essence, this doctrine says that agencies may “promulgate regulations in a piecemeal 
fashion” rather than in one omnibus regulation that comprehensively addresses all issues germane to 
the regulatory goal. 302  Even when Congress has mandated that an agency develop a regulatory 
scheme, this doctrine effectively gives the agency a pass when it comes to carveouts, at least in its 
initial rules. In some sense, this is the opposite power of what scholars have called regulatory 
bundling303: it is the power to engage in regulatory unbundling.304 
Perhaps the generally lighter touch to judicial review of unrules grows out of a 
misunderstanding of unrules’ prevalence and their consequences. For instance, in justifying the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance to hold unreviewable agency 
decisions not to issue rules, Justice Scalia characterized disputes over what we call unrules as merely 
 
297 Arguably, giving unrules a lighter touch runs contrary to the spirit of the Court’s canonical decision on judicial review 
under the arbitrary and capricious clause. Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (“We 
believe that the rescission or modification of an occupant protection standard is subject to the same [arbitrary and 
capricious] test.”). The State Farm Court confirmed that deregulatory changes to rules should be subject to the same 
searching review as new rules. Id.; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
298 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
299  Id. at 360 (“[W]e think most regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, permit such agency showings in 
appropriate cases.”). The Supreme Court’s decision in the Little Sisters of the Poor case is in a similar vein. See supra notes 
204-207 and accompanying text. 
300 Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
301 Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
302 Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 131 (“The 
one-step-at-a-time doctrine rests on the notion that since agencies have great discretion to treat a problem partially, the 
court of appeals should not strike down a regulation if it is a first step toward a complete solution.”). 
303 Jennifer Nou & Edward H. Stiglitz, Regulatory Bundling, 128 YALE L.J. 1174 (2019). 
304 There are obviously parallels here to the Chenery doctrine, which says that agencies generally have discretion to engage 
in policymaking through rulemaking or through adjudication. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
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“abstract policy disagreements.” 305  Yet in contrast to Justice Scalia’s suggestion that unrules are 
relatively innocuous, we have shown in this Article that unrules can have immense consequences in 
terms of public health and safety, interest group influence, and the rule of law. Recognizing both the 
ubiquity and the risks of unrules surely implies that courts should take seriously claims of injury from 
an agency’s decision to create differential treatment via unrules. Such recognition should lead courts 
to resist concluding that agency unrules are committed to agency discretion or that no law can guide 
judicial review of unrules.306 Instead, courts should ensure that the presumption of reviewability of 
agency action applies as much to unrules as to rules.307 
 
D.    Steps Toward Reorienting Administrative Law 
 
 The unified framework and empirical analysis we have provided in this Article show that 
administrative discretion is considerably broader than many judges and administrative law scholars 
typically assume. Yet today, administrative law continues to focus much more on one facet of that 
discretion—namely, discretion in imposing regulatory obligations—with much judicial and academic 
commentary overlooking the “second face” of administrative discretion over the alleviation of 
obligations.308 The real-world effects of this second face of discretionary power may simply be harder 
to see because of the biases we have discussed in the transparency requirements, administrative 
procedures, and judicial review doctrines that govern unrules. But once one’s eyes are opened to 
seeing the operation of the second face of administrative power, to recognizing that it too poses risks 
of error or abuse, and finally to understanding that current administrative law doctrines and practices 
fail to address these risks, it then follows that judges and scholars should consider the task of 
reorienting or rebalancing administrative law.  
Rebalancing administrative law is of course a substantial undertaking—one that requires 
determining precisely how to effectuate appropriate doctrinal and institutional change. Choices will 
need to be made about which doctrines (for example, standing requirements, the logical outgrowth 
test) should be modified, and precisely how those doctrines and procedures should be modified. 
Making these decisions wisely will require careful analysis, due consideration of tradeoffs, and proper 
attentiveness to potential unintended consequences. In making these decisions, reformers would do 
well to aim for symmetrical treatment of unrules wherever possible.309 Toward that goal, any or all 
 
305 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (emphasis added). 
306 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971) (holding that 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) applies to 
preclude judicial review of agency action whenever the operative statute provides no law to guide court’s review). 
307 See McAleenan, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 235-36. 
308  We acknowledge seminal work in political science that refers to a “second face” of governmental power that is 
essentially the power to refrain from exercising power. See generally Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of 
Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 948 (1962); MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE UN-POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION: A STUDY OF 
NON-DECISIONMAKING IN THE CITIES 18-26 (1971); STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 20-25(1974). In law, two 
faces of power have been described as the “power to command”—or what we call obligation imposition—and the “power 
to defer”—or what we call obligation alleviation. Cary Coglianese & Christopher Yoo, supra note 87, at 1591-1596. 
Between the extremes of heightened judicial scrutiny and no scrutiny at all “lies the power to defer,” although it lies 
“usually closer to the ‘no constraint whatsoever’ end of the spectrum … at least absent any specific guidelines for action 
contained within an applicable statute.” Id. at 1596. 
309 See Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors) (arguing that administrative law is increasingly marked by an asymmetry 
in the context of interpretive discretion, and cataloguing a variety of reasons why that trend is troubling). 
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of the doctrines and procedures we have reviewed in this Part should be on the table for 
reconsideration. 
Pulling back the curtain, as we have begun to do here, is a vital first step. But charting the 
path forward will be difficult if unrules continue to remain as obscure as they have been. Thus, the 
most important immediate step to take is to increase the transparency of unrules. Doing so will 
provide a basis for much needed additional research and will help provide a way to ground decisions 
about future doctrinal reform. It could also help, in its own way, to address some of the risks of 
unrules—producing some sunlight that might serve as a disinfectant.310 To that end, we close our 
inquiry by offering a few suggestions for improving the transparency of both dispensations and 
carveouts. 
To address the obscurity of dispensations, Congress or the President could require, or 
agencies could impose as a duty placed upon themselves, the consistent practice of maintaining online 
lists of all granted dispensations. Similar publication requirements have been imposed by executive 
order on agencies with respect to their guidance documents.311 As noted above, some agencies are 
already following this practice by publishing lists of dispensation recipients.312 It would not be asking 
agencies to undertake anything infeasible to expect this practice to be followed across the federal 
government.313  
Improving access to records of requests and decisions on dispensations would go far in 
reducing the burdens of legal mobilization for the potential beneficiaries of obligations that are being 
dispensed, and potentially might even reduce arbitrariness and abuse of power in the granting of 
dispensations in a way that benefits regulatory obligatees. Of course, we have noted already that 
transparency requirements imposed on agencies suffer from a lack of self-reinforcing incentives to 
comply. 314  Options exist to alter incentives and improve compliance, such as the possibility of 
creating a cause of action under FOIA for challenging generalized agency policies and practices that 
lead to the underproduction of information, mandating independent audits of agency records, or 
perhaps even imposing personal liability on officials who willingly keep no-action letters from a 
public repository.315 These possibilities should be explored further in an effort to improve the quality 
of recordkeeping on dispensations. 
When it comes to reforming administrative law’s approach to carveouts, we suggest two 
initial steps. First, mechanisms are needed that could better ensure that carveouts are not lost in the 
 
310 Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY (Dec. 1913). 
311 Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents, Exec. Order 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 
(Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/15/2019-22623/promoting-the-rule-of-law-through- 
improved-agency-guidance-documents. 
312 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
313 Recent reports and recommendations issued by the Administrative Conference of the United States also provide agencies 
with excellent guidance. Public Availability of Agency Guidance Documents, ACUS Recommendation 2019-3 (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.acus.gov/research-projects/public-availability-agency-guidance-documents; Regulatory Waivers and Exemp-
tions, ACUS Recommendation 2017-7 (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recom 
mendation%202017-7%20%28Regulatory%20Waivers%20and%20Exemptions%29_0.pdf. 
314 See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2017) (noting 
that certain features of FOIA “arguably create a perverse incentive for officials to classify more, not less,” agency information as 
exempt from disclosure); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 919-20 (2006) (acknowledging that 
“the transparency requirement is imposed . . . upon the state apparatus, which may choose not to comply.”); Heidi Kitrosser, 
“Trust Me” and Transparency Do Not Mix, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 20 (discussing the “intrinsic weakness of any transparency 
strategy that depends on self-policing”). 
315 For a useful collection of enforcement mechanisms that could be modeled in this context, see Pozen, supra note 314, at 1107-11. 
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shuffle of the rulemaking process. When agencies publish notices of their proposed and final rules, 
in the future they could be expected to provide fair notice to the public of any decisions about classes 
or categories of potential regulatory targets that have been carved out of the rule, with an explanation 
of why these classes or categories are not covered. Agencies do sometimes disclose such 
information,316 and the anticipation of arbitrary and capricious review by the courts certainly gives 
them some reason to discuss the rule’s scope. But they are not otherwise required to discuss in detail 
the carveouts that they create. Going forward, agencies could be required to include a separate 
designated paragraph or section discussing a new or amended rule’s scope in each preamble to a rule 
document in the Federal Register.317 This would provide the public with clearer information about 
those entities, activities, and time periods covered and not covered by a rule. 
The second step would be to make regulatory analysis more evenly balanced between obligation 
imposition and alleviation. For example, OIRA could demand that agencies make plain how unrules—
both carveouts and dispensations—figure into their regulatory proposals and account for them explicitly 
in their relevant analyses. Best practices in regulatory analysis already call upon agencies to quantify 
various uncertainties surrounding the impacts of regulatory obligations.318 These best practices could be 
expanded to encompass the expectation that agencies conduct sensitivity analysis around the degree of 
implementation of their rules and to consider possible adverse consequences from any substantial exercise 
of obligation alleviation authority by the agency in the future. Doing so would not only help promote 
better agency decision-making; it would also put the public on better notice of the effects of unrules. 
Furthermore, retrospective studies of the actual use of dispensations could provide better information 
about the actual implementation of regulations, in turn improving efforts ex ante to estimate the actual 
benefits and costs of proposed regulations.319 
We do not pretend, of course, that these various steps toward increased transparency of both 
carveouts and dispensations will fully correct the imbalance in the administrative law system. But the first 
step—which we have provided with this Article—is to recognize that unrules are ubiquitous, they present 
risks, and they currently escape the full scrutiny given to agency decisions to impose rules. Only with such 
recognition can lawyers, judges, and legislators begin to develop more systematic reforms that will even 
the playing field between obligation imposition and alleviation. In addition, with such recognition, any 
 
316 See, e.g., Stormwater Phase II Final Rule: Who’s Covered? , EPA 833-F-00-003 (Jan. 2000), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-
1.pdf (walking through which municipal systems are regulated and which are not under the agency’s stormwater discharge 
regulations). 
317 This proposal is not unlike those of others who have urged that agencies be required to publish a compact summary 
or scorecard of a proposed regulation’s costs and benefits. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive 
Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1518 (2002) 
(proposing that agencies provide a one-page summary of their regulatory impact analyses). A mandatory summary 
statement of individuals, entities, activities, and time periods falling both within and outside of a regulation’s scope should 
be both simpler and less controversial than even a summary of benefits and costs. To some extent, a standard template 
for rulemaking documents used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency already calls for something close to what 
we suggest in that it includes a standard section set off with the question, “Does this action apply to me?” See, e.g., U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Update to the Refrigerant Management 
Requirements Under the Clean Air Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 82,272, 82,273 (Nov. 18, 2016). Of course, the EPA’s template 
exhibits its own biased focus on obligation imposition rather than obligation alleviation, as the agency uses this section 
of its template to indicate to whom the rule applies, avoiding saying to whom it does not.  
318  Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Circular A-4, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer 14 (2011), 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. 
319 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57 (2013) (arguing for the institution 
of retrospective reviews of the actual costs and benefits of important regulations that previously went through OIRA 
review). 
Draft 9.22.20]                                                                     UNRULES [73 STAN. L. REV. __ 
 
 56 
 
initial efforts to increase the transparency of unrules in the day-to-day practice of administrative agencies 
should help jumpstart a virtuous circle of further deliberations over carefully calibrated reforms. 
A variety of factors have undoubtedly contributed to the way in which administrative law has 
turned a relative blind eye to unrules. In bringing greater attention to the current administrative law 
system’s myopia, we do not mean to suggest that agencies deliberately take advantage of the shadows that 
the system tends to cast over their use of unrules.320 But the current imbalanced system of oversight does 
make it easier for agencies to take shortcuts, and fails to consider fully the consequences of their decisions. 
Agencies, after all, are routinely confronting the challenge of setting priorities and managing large tasks 
with limited staffing and budgetary resources.321 That challenge poses risks of error, even among the most 
well-intentioned of public servants. It also necessitates careful management of agencies’ power both to 
impose and alleviate obligations. Just as it can take time and adequate resources to impose obligations in 
a thoughtful and responsible manner, agencies—and their overseers—must recognize that obligation-
alleviating power also demands time and resources if it is to be exercised with care. Taking steps to reduce 
administrative law’s bias in favor of unrules could go a long way toward helping encourage more 
thoughtful, fair, and effective efforts to alleviate obligations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Outside the Federal Trade Commission building in Washington, D.C. stand two massive 
limestone sculptures that neatly encapsulate the conventional view of government regulation. In 
polished Art Deco style, the sculptures each depict a muscular man grappling with a wildly excited 
horse. 322  Judging from the title the artist gave to these works—“Man Controlling Trade”—the 
sculptures appear to have a straightforward meaning: the horse represents the free market, with its 
dynamic and potentially dangerous energy, while the man represents government’s attempt to 
control economic activity and tame it to serve the public’s interest. Yet because the statues freeze the 
man and the horse in stone, the meaning the artwork conveys visually is actually more ambiguous. Is 
the man pulling the horse back and trying to harness its energy, or is he instead simply struggling to 
release the horse from its restraint? 
Buried within this visual ambiguity lies a deeper truth about regulation: a full account of the 
U.S. regulatory system must pay more attention to the fact that this system not only imposes 
obligations but avoids and lifts them as well. Every regulatory obligation contains its limits that carve 
some actors or activities out of its scope—and agencies always have opportunities to alleviate 
regulatory obligations even further by granting dispensations. 
 Although too often thought peripheral, unrules are an integral and highly consequential part 
of the regulatory state. They can also introduce distinctive risks of government failure. Not only can 
they undermine policy effectiveness, but they can also provide a ready source of favoritism and 
arbitrariness in administration. These risks are heightened by the fact that obligation alleviation 
remains relatively less constrained by administrative law. 
 
320 We have not attempted to analyze the political economy behind agencies’ decisions to create unrules (as opposed to 
the political economies pushing agencies to create unrules) in this Article, although such investigation would be 
worthwhile in future scholarship. 
321 See PAUL VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY 49-50 (2017). 
322 Man Controlling Trade, ATLAS OBSCURA, https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/man-controlling-trade (last accessed 
Feb. 17, 2020). 
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Recognizing unrules’ ubiquity and centrality should make evident the need to rebalance 
administrative law through additional efforts to increase the oversight of, and constraints on, 
agencies’ discretion to alleviate obligations. At a minimum, a reoriented administrative law would 
bring unrules out of the shadows and subject them to more robust requirements for transparency. 
Courts could also make more even-handed the law governing access to judicial review and the 
application of that review. Oversight institutions such as OIRA could scrutinize unrules more 
consistently so that the public has better information about how obligation alleviation might affect 
the costs and benefits of regulation.  
Increased attention to unrules ultimately will advance the purposes served by having 
government subject to the rule of law. If administrative law is to control government so that it 
delivers meaningful public value and avoids injustice, then law and lawyers need to recognize and 
respond to all of the consequential ways that the government interacts with society, both those ways 
that seek to bring trade under control and those that loosen restraints.  
 
 
